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In January 1998, the Tenth Circuit held in Law v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association that a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
regulation limiting the salaries of some assistant basketball coaches violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act; the $67 million judgment is the largest ever against the
NCAA. Although the parties later settled for a somewhat smaller amount before
an appeal on damages was decided, the case went a long way toward destroying
a perceived wall of invulnerability the NCAA had previously enjoyed in the
courts. Perhaps encouraged by the coaches'success, at least two manufacturers
of athletic equipment and apparel have sued the NCAA for antitrust violations.
In addition, the Law verdict reopens the possibility that student-athletes may
begin to assert antitrust violations against the NCAA with greater success. This
Note analyzes the Law decision and considers its future implications- both for
the NCAA and for the parties with whom the organization conducts its business
and athletic affairs.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Justice Harry S. Blackmn announced that "[p]rofessional baseball is a
business and it is engaged in interstate commerce,"1 nearly thirty years ago, the
concession must have seemed comical to most observers of sports and the law, as
though he were the last person on earth to arrive at that obvious conclusion.
Nevertheless, the outmoded view that sports are nothing more than "games" in
contemporary American society has maintained its hallowed-if erroneous-
place in our jurisprudence for more than seventy-five years. The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) successfully relied on the facade for
decades, "elud[ing] Sherman Act challenges by virtue of its status as a nonprofit
self-regulatory organization that was primarily involved in promoting amateur
athletic competition, rather than in a purely commercial activity of the type
traditionally regulated by the Sherman Act' 2
* The Ohio State University College of Law, Class of 2000. I would like to thank my wife,
Pamela, for encouraging me to take the Law School Admissions Test, and for her unending
support and patience during the last three years. I also thank my family, especially my parents,
Merv and Barb Krakau, and my wife's family, especially Fay Carmichael and Bob Schweitzer,
and Ron Wheeler and Stephanie Tran, for their love and support. This Note is dedicated to my
children, Brady and Amber, who remind me every day what is truly important in life.
1 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). Justice Blackmn should not be judged too
harshly; the admission was necessary because of an earlier Court's failure to own up to the truth
in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922), the infamous case that
gave professional baseball its unique exemption to federal antitrust laws. The Court's holding in
Federal Baseball Club has never been overruled.
2 Thomas Scully, Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma. The
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In January 1998, a bombshell crumbled that facade, perhaps irreparably,
when the Tenth Circuit in Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association upheld
a federal court ruling that an NCAA regulation limiting the annual salaries of
some assistant basketball coaches to $16,000 was a violation of section one of the
Sherman Act The jury's $22 million verdict was trebled pursuant to the
Sherman Act; the resulting judgment of $67 million is the largest ever against the
NCAA.4 Perhaps emboldened by the success of the suit, two sports equipment
manufacturers-Easton and Adidas 5-filed their own federal antitrust suits
against the NCAA in 1998. Easton, a baseball bat manufacturer, is challenging
aluminum bat specifications set to become effective in spring 2000. Easton seeks
damages in excess of $200 million. The Adidas suit challenges an NCAA rule
that limits corporate logos on team uniforms to a size no greater than 2.25 square
inches.6 Twenty years ago, the NCAA may have viewed these lawsuits as
publicity stunts posing little threat to the organization or its bank accounts.
However, in the wake of Law, the NCAA can no longer afford to take antitrust
suits lightly.
Antitrust actions against the NCAA pose special problems for the federal
court system. Doctrinally, the courts' longstanding reluctance to apply the federal
antitrust laws to the NCAA may now be working to the NCAA's disadvantage.
Every foregone opportunity to construct a framework for the decision of NCAA
antitrust cases has left a void in the law. But Law and other cases indicate the
likelihood that the courts will not grant the NCAA any leeway in future cases on
the ground that the NCAA has a settled expectation that the antitrust laws do not
apply to it. Because of the risk of blackmail suits,7 and because the Law verdict is
NCAA 's Television Plan Is Sacked by the Sherman Act, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1985).
3 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998); Law v. NCAA, No. 94-2053-
KHV, 1996 WL 104328 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 1996); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract,
combination in the form of tmst or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.). The suit was
brought as a class action by assistant basketball coaches affected by the rule. The rule,
conceived by a group of university presidents, was adopted by a vote of Division I schools in
1991. See Chip Brown, Members Look for Ways to Pay Judgment on Restricted Earnings,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Januaiy 12, 1999, at 4B.
4 See Steve Rock, NCAA Balks at Releasing $10 Million: Money Intendad for Schools Is
Set Asidefor Jugment, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 29,1998, at Al. The NCAA initially pursued an
appeal on the issue of damages but settled the case in March 1999 for $54.5 million. See
Schools React to RulingAgainst NCAA, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 15,1999, at 21.
5 See generally Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Kan. 1999).
6 See Adidas, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. The Adidas suit did not specify a damage amount
See Adidas Sues NCAA Over Uniforns, AP, Nov. 13, 1998, available in WESrLAW, 1998 WL
22418393 (no page number available).
7 It is likely that the Easton suit is such an action, designed to exert pressure on the NCAA
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likely to subject the NCAA to a large volume of antitrust suits in the future, it is
important that this area of the law achieve a higher degree of certainty than it
currently has attained. At the same time, the courts must strike a balance that
allows the NCAA or any successor organization 8 a fair amount of room to
operate and make reasonable regulations for member institutions.
To that end, Part Il of this Note examines the analytical framework courts
employ in assessing antitrust challenges to NCAA rules and regulations. As an
initial matter, it will discuss which types of regulations are subject to antitrust
scrutiny and which types may be insulated from such scrutiny because of their
noncommercial character. Part I will then review the three-prong rule of reason
test, which is likely to be used in any antitrust suit facing the NCAA.9 Next, Part
II will analyze the holding in Law that plaintiffs had satisfied the first prong and
that the NCAA had failed to satisfy the second prong. Finally, Part II will
examine the third prong-which the court in Law found unnecessary to reach
because of its disposition of the case-and will propose a workable model for the
decision of cases that will reduce uncertainty and provide redress for those
victimized by the NCAA's anticompetitive practices, while concurrently
protecting procompetitive and noncommercial regulations from haphazard
invalidation.
Part III of this Note will evaluate the claims of Easton and Adidas and assess
the companies' chances for success. The discussion will include an assessment of
how a better articulated third prong of the rule of reason analysis could operate in
practice, especially as to Adidas' claim, which is a more likely case to reach the
third prong.
Part IV will consider the past and present litigation against the NCAA to
(1) to settle, and (2) to postpone implementation of the rule. If that was Easton's intention, the
company has already been successful to some degree. A few days after the lawsuit was filed,
the NCAA Executive Committee decided to delay implementation of the rule for one year. It is
now scheduled to go into effect in the spring of 2000. In response, Easton amended its suit,
reducing the damage claim by $30 million. See Steve Rock, Bat Manufacturer Amends
ComplaintAgainst NCAA, KAN. CIY STAR, Sept. 11, 1998, at D6.
8 There has been some talk of a rebellion, whereby some universities with major athletic
programs would break away from the NCAA and form their own organization. See Bob
Gilbert, Judgment Could Endanger NCAA "s Future, THE KNOXV NEWS-SENTNEL, Oct 18,
1998, at BC7 (noting that "NCAA officials, fearing an internal rebellion that might threaten its
very existence, have reminded Division I presidents the vote approving restricted-eamings
coaches was almost unanimous"). But see Rock, supra note 4 (stating that "[t]he NCAA is not
under threat of revolf'). However, there is some precedent for at least a limited revolt. In 1979,
five major conferences and some major independent universities, displeased with the NCAA's
handling of college football, broke away and formed the College Football Association (CFA).
The NCAA's attempted retaliation against the CFA led directly to NCAA v. Board ofRegents of
the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
9 See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01 (choosing to apply rule of reason analysis
rather than per se rule of invalidity because the case "involves an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all").
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determine what the future may have in store for the NCAA and intercollegiate
athletics. Part IV will then consider other NCAA rules susceptible to invalidation
under the Sherman Act, including restrictions on the number of games teams are
allowed to play in each sport, restrictions on the number of paid coaches, and
restrictions on job and compensation restrictions of athletes. Part IV also will
consider how the decision in Law will affect the NCAA with respect to other
federal laws, including Title IX and other civil rights legislation, Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and workers' compensation laws. Part IV also
will ask whether the NCAA can remain a viable organization in the face of
increased legal pressures imposed by Law and other recent court developments,
and will attempt to: (1) identify mistakes the NCAA has made in defending recent
lawsuits against it; (2) define when the NCAA may prudently draw its battle
lines; and (3) suggest areas in which the NCAA may be better advised to change
its rules and policies to avoid antitrust and other litigation. Finally, Part IV will
assess the possibility of a rebellion by NCAA member schools and what effect
such a threat will and should have as the NCAA adapts to the ever-changing legal
landscape with which it must comply.
II. RULE OF REASON GIVES NCAA A CHANCE TO JuSTIFY RESTRAINTS OF
TRADE
Although the Law decision has been interpreted-correctly-as an ill omen
for the NCAA, 0 two judicially imposed safeguards protect the organization from
10 See Welch Suggs & John Lombardo, NCAA Struggles with Antitrust Battles, CIN. Bus.
COURIER, Oct. 2, 1998, at I1B (quoting Tulane University law professor Gary Roberts: "Once
you start down the road of cherry-picking rules, the NCAA is just one gigantic mess of antitrust
violations .... What happens when a kid wants to go to Notre Dame, they don't have a
scholarship and he sues the NCAA over restricting his ability to play football?"). The likely
answer to Professor Roberts' Notre Dame hypothetical is: The "kid" loses. In Jones v. NCAA,
392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975), the court noted that "[a]ny limitation on access to
intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization's pursuit of its legitimate
goals." While the issue in Jones pertained to the NCAA's promulgation of eligibility rules, the
language is equally applicable to limitations on the number of scholarships. From a policy
standpoint, to hold otherwise would be to open the floodgates for every spurned high school
letter winner to sue her favorite university when her school of choice declined to offer a
scholarship. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1998), vacatedon other grounds,
525 U.S. 459 (1999) (holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA's
promulgation of eligibility requirements). The Smith case possibly could be read to deny
standing to athletes because they are not individuals "injured in [their] business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," and thus have no federally sanctioned cause
of action. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Smith case, but
solely on the issue of whether the NCAA is subject to the Title IX ban on sex discrimination by
recipients of federal financial assistance. The Court did not consider the issue of whether the
Third Circuit properly rejected Smith's antitrust claim. See Recent Case, 20 (5) ENT. L. REP. 20,
Oct. 1998.
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antitrust suits: (1) a threshold consideration of whether the Sherman Act is
applicable to certain NCAA regulations;11 and (2) the use of a rule of reason
analysis even in cases of horizontal price restraints like the one struck down in
Law. Such restraints in other contexts generally lead to a per se rule of
invalidity.12 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court evaluated the NCAA's plan for televising football games under
the rule of reason, even though the plan restrained price and output 13 The Court
concluded that the rule of reason was appropriate because the case "involve[d] an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product
is to be available at all.' 14
This Part will (1) consider whether and to what extent NCAA regulations
should be free from Sherman Act challenge altogether;, (2) set out the three-
pronged analytical framework for rule of reason cases; (3) discuss in some detail
why the NCAA was unable to meet the second prong of the test; and (4) construct
a more concrete mode of analysis for the third prong than has so far been
articulated. 15
A. The Thorny Problem of "Commercial Objectives"
Before confronting the rule of reason in all its complexity and inscrutability, a
plaintiff must first clear an initial hurdle to bring an antitrust action; it must
convince the trial court that federal antitrust law applies to the defendant's
challenged conduct.16 The Supreme Court has stated that the Sherman Act "is
aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied
only to a very limited extent to organizations ... which normally have other
objectives."'1 7 Because some of the NCAA's objectives are noncommercial, some
Supreme Court precedent suggests that regulations designed to achieve those
noncommercial objectives are immune from application of the antitrust laws.18
11 See Smith, 139 F.3d at 186.12 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
However, in cases involving price restraints, such as the restricted-earnings coaches rule at issue
in Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998), a rule of reason analysis may be a little more
forgiving than the per se rule. This point will be further explored. See infra Part II.B.
13 See id. at 103.
14 Id. at 101.
15 Because the NCAA failed in carrying its burden of proof as to the second prong, it was
unnecessary for the court in Law to address the third. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1024 n.16.
16 See generally Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
17 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998), vacatedon other grounds, 525 U.S.
459 (1999) (quoting KIor's, 359 U.S. at 213 n.7); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469,492-93 (1940).
18 Compare Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) with Smith v. NCAA, 139
F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit in Law never addressed the threshold question
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For example, the Third Circuit pointed out the "noncommercial" character of
athletic eligibility rules to find that such rules were not subject to antitrust analysis
in Smith v. NCA,,.19 A federal disirict court recently employed the same rationale
whether the restricted-earnings coaches nile involved the type of "commercial activity" that
would bring the rule within the ambit of the antitrust laws. However, because the rule was an
example of horizontal price-fixing, the commercial character of the rule was evident. In Smith,
the Third Circuit held that NCAA eligibility standards are not susceptible to antitrust analysis
because "eligibility rules are not related to the NCAA's commercial or business activities.'
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185. The court in Smith distinguished Law by pointing out that "[tjhe bylaw
at issue in Law concerned a restriction on the business activities of the institutions, whereas the
[bylaw at issue in Smith] does not." Id. at 186 n.4. In support of its decision, the Third Circuit
cited Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). The issue was whether a labor strike
could be considered a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. In his majority opinion
finding for the union, Justice Stone described the purpose of the Sherman Act:
The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all
of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury.
Id. at 493 (citing legislative history of the Sherman Act). Under this view, the Sherman Act
injury in Law was not to the restricted-earnings coaches, but to consumers--the ticket-buying
and television-watching public-who were viewing a product inferior to what they would have
seen if the market had been allowed to dictate coaches' salaries. For a somewhat more
sophisticated description of this "consumer welfare" concept, see Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA,
Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2637 (1996). It is section four of the
Clayton Act that provided the plaintiffs in Law with their cause of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1994).
19 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). The
presence of noncommercial objectives could also be a key first line of defense for the NCAA in
a number of other foreseeable antitrust suits. The presence of noncommercial objective would
at least arguably be applicable to rules governing: (1) the athletic contests themselves; (2) the
recruiting procedure; (3) the conduct of coaches and other university athletic department
personnel; and (4) the preservation of the amateur status of the athletes. Rules limiting
production, inputs, and outputs are less likely to find refuge in this doctrine-which I will call
the "noncommercial objective defense"--because they are clearly of a commercial nature. It
should also be noted that the noncommercial objective defense may not be available outside the
Third Circuit The court in Smith noted that it was aware of no other federal court of appeals
that had addressed the issue of whether antitrust laws apply to NCAA eligibility rules.
However, the court pointed to several federal district court cases which have held that antitrust
laws not applicable to various NCAA rules. See Smith, 139 F3d at 185 (citing Gaines v.
NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744-46 (M.D. Term. 1990) (holding antitrust laws inappropriate as a
vehicle for invalidating eligibility rules); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass.
1975) (same); College Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, CA 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at
*2-*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (holding that NCAA rule adopted for the purpose of preserving
the educational standards of its members is not subject to antitrust analysis). Other courts seem
more willing to bypass this threshold inquiry and advance directly to a rule of reason analysis.
See, e.g., Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing
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in denying Adidas a preliminary injunction in its case against the NCAA.20 Such
an argument may also be available to the NCAA if the Easton lawsuit goes to
trial.21 It almost certainly would not be available to ward off challenges to NCAA
rules that limit output or fix prices?2
However these issues are decided, they are by-products of two underlying
questions, the answers to which should not be assumed: (1) Should the antitrust
laws apply to the NCAA as a matter of statutory construction or public policy?;
and (2) Should at least some categories of NCAA rules be exempt from antitrust
scrutiny? On one hand, the NCAA is a nonprofit organization and was created for
a wholly noncommercial reason-to decrease the number of deaths that were
occurring at an alarming rate in college football games.2 3 It is perhaps for this
reason that courts initially refused to view the NCAA as an appropriate target for
antitrust Scrutiny.24 On the other hand, intercollegiate athletics--primarily
Pac-10 Conference's imposition of sanctions on the University of Washington for recruiting
violations under the rule of reason). In Hairston, the district court had granted the Pac-10
summary judgment as to some plaintiffs on the ground that they lacked standing. The Ninth
Circuit rejected that argument, affirming on the ground that no antitrust violation had occurred:
"An increasing number of courts, unfortunately, deny standing when they really mean that no
violation has occurred." Id. at 1318 (quoting 2 PHmLip E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAMP,
ANTrRUST LAW 360f, at 202-03 (rev. ed. 1995)). Because the Third Circuit in Smith referred
not to standing (which would be judged with reference to the plaintiff) but to the nature of the
rule (in terms of the NCAA's noncommercial objectives in promulgating it), it is unclear
whether these cases are in direct tension.
20 See Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1999).
21 This possibility will be considered more fully in Part RA. See infra notes 22-30 and
accompanying text.
22 This is because such rules are highly likely to have been implemented for commercial
purposes. The NCAA basically conceded the existence of a commercial purpose behind the
restricted-eamings coaches rule at issue in Law by arguing that cost-cutting was one of the
rule's procompetitive benefits. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022. The NCAA likely will not make the
same mistake in future cases. Even if cost containment was a motivating factor behind
promulgation of a particular rule, the NCAA should know better than to say so.
2 3 See Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the
NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 Wis. L. REv.
545, 545 & n.1 (discussing the "legend" that President Theodore Roosevelt summoned the
leaders of 62 universities to the White House after a "particularly brutal game between Harvard
and Yale"); cf. Ronald J. Thompson, Comment, Due Process and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association: Are There Any Constitutional Standards?, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1651, 1652
(1994). According to Thompson, Roosevelt met only with the chancellor of New York
University, and 62 colleges and universities subsequently 'Tormed a rule-making body that
would later become the NCAA. The original purpose of the organization was to prevent
'commercialism, excessive physical injury to student athletes, and cheating by some
participating schools."' Id. (citing GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 1-2 (1986);
Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athleties: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1978)).
24 See Scully, supra note 2, at 857 (noting inapplicability of antitrust laws to any sports
organization until International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242
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Division I football and men's basketball-generate millions of dollars annually,
for member schools and for the NCAA itself.25 Moreover, a cursory reading of
the Sherman Act suggests that the NCAA as an organization falls squarely within
the Act's parameters. "Every contract combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."'26 The Supreme Court in
Board of Regents pointed to the "sweeping language" of section one of the
Sherman Act as an indication that it applies to nonprofit entities. 27 In addition, the
Court suggested that the NCAA may be a "nonprofit" organization in name only:
The economic significance of the NCAA's nonprofit character is questionable
at best Since the District Court found that the NCAA and its member institutions
are in fact organized to maximize revenues ... it is unclear why petitioner is less
likely to restrict output in order to raise revenues above those that could be
realized in a competitive market than would be a for-profit entity.28
The application of antitrust laws to the NCAA not only comports with the
plain language of the Sherman Act and recognizes the revenue-maximizing goals
of the NCAA, but also provides a key check on the organization's power, which
would otherwise be effectively limitless. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment29 does not apply to the NCAA because the Supreme
Court has held that the NCAA is not a state actor.30 Not only that, but in 1992 a
(1959)).
25 The NCAA recently signed a $6 billion, l1-year deal with CBS giving the network the
right to broadcast the NCAA's men's basketball tournament starting in 2003. See David
Cisneros, NCAA Earns Billions, but What About Its Athletes?, DAILY TROJAN, June 12, 2000.
ABC currently pays the NCAA $78.6 million a year for the rights to broadcast college football
games. See Lee Barfknecht, ESPN Playoff View, 'Hypocrites' Remark Upset NU's Byrne,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 7, 2000, at 21. For the 1998-1999 school year, the 11 schools
in the Big 10 Athletic Conference generated record revenues of $415.6 million. See Fred
Girard, Women 's Sports a Costly Venture: Losses, Construction Costs Counteract Men's Sports
Revenue, DETROn'NEWS, Dec. 19, 1999, at Dl. Of that figure, $172 million came from football
(with a $93 million net profit), and $71 million came from men's basketball (with a $25 million
net profit). Big 10 schools also "took in $139 million in endorsements, royalties, donations and
other types of revenue... .". Id. Women's basketball lost $9 million, all other women's sports
lost $38 million, and all other men's sports lost $18 million. See id
26 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
2 7 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984).
2 8 Id. (internal citation omitted).
29 
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 179 (1988). Tarkanian was the head men's
basketball coach at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV). The NCAA basically forced
UNLV to strip Tarkanian of his coaching position or risk being ejected from the NCAA. When
UNLV announced it was demoting Tarkanian to tenured professor of physical education,
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federal district court held that a Nevada state law requiring the NCAA to comply
with the Due Process Clause was itself unconstitutional. 31 The ruling was
something of a confirmation of former UNLV and current Fresno State men's
basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian's statement: "Sometimes I feel the NCAA is the
only organization that's above the law."32 The NCAA's Due Process Clause
immunity is all the more reason to hold the organization accountable under
federal antitrust law. 33
There is some sentiment for aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws in
"business" situations like those in Board of Regents and Law but for deference to
the NCAA rules governing amateurism. The district court in Law relied in part on
such a distinction in finding the restricted-earnings coaches (REu nule to be in
violation of the Sherman Act.34 However, it is difficult to view this as a principled
distinction. As Professor Roberts says: "[1]t is very questionable whether antitrust
or public policy is served by, in effect, giving substantially greater economic 'free
Tarkanian sued the NCAA. See id. at 181. The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens writing for the
majority, held 5-4 that the NCAA was a private actor and thus not bound by the strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment See id at 179. "Neither UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's
standards nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the
NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards governing athlete
recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance." Id. at 195. Justice White wrote a strong
dissent, noting:
By the terms of UNLV's membership in the NCAA, the NCAA's findings were final and
not subject to further review by any other body... and it was for that reason that UNLV
suspended Tarkanian, despite concluding that many of those findings were wrong. In
short, it was the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at
NCAA-conducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its membership
agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV. On these
facts, the NCAA was 'jointly engaged with [UNLV] officials in the challenged action,"
and there was a state actor.
Id. at 201-02 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)). The
author of this Note believes Justice White has the better view, but is cognizant of Ohio State
Law Professor Howard P. Fink's unassailable mathematical theory of Supreme Court
jurisprudence: "Five is greater than four." Professor Howard P. Fink, Civil Procedure Class
Lectures at The Ohio State University College of Law (Fall 1997-Spring 1998).
31 See NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Nev. 1992), af'd, 10 F3d 633 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that statutes violate the Commerce Clause); Thompson, supra note 23, at
1652 (citing Danny Robbins, Court Voids Nevada Law, LA. TIMEs, June 6, 1992, at Cl).
32 Thompson, supra note 23, at 1652 (citing William F. Reed, Rebel Reprieve: In a
Turnaround, the NCAA Lets UNLV Defend Its Title, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 10, 1990, at
46,49).
33 See Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 23, at 546 (arguing that antitrust law is a better
vehicle for judicial oversight of the NCAA than constitutional law would be).




market' protection to sports fans who watch NCAA sports and to coaches than to
the young (and relatively politically powerless) athletes who produce these sports
products." 35
B. The Analytical Framework. The Three-Pronged Model of the Rule of
Reason
The rationale for the rule of reason was stated succinctly by former Judge
Bork: "Some activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading
example is league sports. When a league of professional lacrosse teams is formed,
it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on the ground that there
are no other professional lacrosse teams."36 The rule of reason operates not as a
true balancing test but as a shifting of the burden of proof from plaintiff to
defendant and back to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff must make an initial
showing that an agreement has a "substantially adverse effect on competition." 37
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must "come forward with
evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct."38 If the
defendant successfully demonstrates such procompetitive effects, the burden of
proof returns to the plaintiff, who must show that the challenged conduct is not
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives or that those objectives
"can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner."39 The following will
examine each prong of the test in turn.
35 Roberts, supra note 18, at 2645; see also Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should
College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 257 (1990) ("Major college
programs have themselves commercialized amateur athletics, usually at the expense of
educational values .... Application of the antitrust laws to the NCAA's amateurism restrictions
would end this hypocrisy.").
36 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (quoting
ROBERTBORK, THEANTrmusTPRADox 278 (1978)).
37 Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
38 Id.
39 Id. The rule of reason test is derived from language in Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The Court wrote:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
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1. The Plaintiffs Initial Burden ofDemonstrating Anticompetitive Effects
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents acknowledged that "every contract
is a restraint of trade," but that "the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade."40 Thus, as a safeguard to ensure that not every
contract is adjudged to be in violation of the Sherman Act, the courts look for
evidence that the anticompetitive effects are significant before finding that the
plaintiff has met her initial burden of proof.4' In cases of horizontal restraints on
price or output-like the ones at issue in Law and Board ofRegents-a finding of
anticompetitive effects is a near certainty. "Restrictions on price and output are
the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was
intended to prohibit."42 In such a case, the primary benefit to the NCAA of a rule
of reason analysis is to allow the NCAA the opportunity to justify the restraint
with a showing of procompetitive benefits. However, cases which do not involve
horizontal restraints on price or output present plaintiffs with a substantial burden
in demonstrating significant anticompetitive effects. 43
2. The Defendant's Burden ofDemonstrating Procompetitive Effects
If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie case for an antitrust
violation, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged illegal conduct actually
40 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,98 (1984).
41 This may be true even in cases in which the per se rule is sought to be applied. See id at
103-04 & n.26 ("Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason
analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.").
42 Id. at 107-08. The Court in Board ofRegents also noted:
The anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are apparent Individual
competitors lose their freedom to compete. Price is higher and output lower than they
would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer preference. This latter point is
perhaps most significant, since "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer
welfare prescription."'
d. at 106-07 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)). In the NCAA
context, the consumer welfare aspects of the federal antitrust laws operate primarily to narrow
the scope of permissible conduct with respect to the number of contests a team is allowed to
play and financial arrangements for television contracts and the like. For a more detailed
discussion of other NCAA rules subject to invalidation under this rationale, see infra Part IVA.
Regulations like the restricted-earnings coaches rule struck down in Law can be viewed as
harms against "person[s] ... injured in [their] business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws," as forbidden by section four of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(a) (1994).
43 This is a major obstacle that Easton must clear in its lawsuit against the NCAA to avoid
a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. See infra Part hIIA.
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promotes competition in some way. The classic example of procompetitive
effects saving an otherwise significantly anticompetitive agreement occurred in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,4 in which the
Court upheld a joint selling agreement for song rights.45 In the context of antitrust
actions against the NCAA, the organization's strongest claim as to procompetitive
benefits is its interest in maintaining a competitive balance among amateur
athletic teams, a justification that the Supreme Court explicitly blessed in Board
ofRegents. 46 As the Court said in that case:
Our decision not to apply a per se rule to this case rests in large part on our
recognition that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of
competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be
preserved. It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic
teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics.47
If the NCAA cannot show that a challenged regulation maintains such a
competitive balance, it may come forward with other justifications. However, as
the NCAA found out in Law, courts may be less receptive to such secondary
arguments. 48
44 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (involving the legality of American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) copyright licensing fees).
45 Id. at 24.
46 468 U.S. at 117.
47 Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 18, at 2654:
The alleged procompetitive benefits of virtually every NCAA rule... are of two general
types. First is the preservation of amateurism, which is procompetitive only because, as the
Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents, amateurism is the essence of the NCAA
members' athletic competition product.... Second is the promotion of competitive
balance among the teams of the member schools, thereby enhancing the quality of the
athletic competition product.
Id. However, the NCAA and its attorneys would be prudent to take heed of a caveat that
appears later in Professor Roberts' Note, namely that the Supreme Court's dictum surmising
that most NCAA regulations are justifiable "should not be treated with 'papal infallibility' since
it does nothing but presume the outcome of factual inquiries that have never been made in the
context of a legal test that has never been clearly articulated." Id. at 2657.48 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998) (retaining of entry-level
coaching positions, reducing costs, and maintaining competitive equity as justifications for the




3. Plaintiffs Burden ofPresenting a Substantially Less Restrictive
Alternative
The third prong of the rule of reason presents the highest degree of
unpredictability for the decision of future cases. As articulated so far, the test is
vague.4 9 This is due in no small part to the fact that the issue was not addressed in
Board of Regents or Law. Professor Roberts has recognized that the "least
restrictive alternative" (LRA) analysis is potentially devastating to the NCAA.50
However, because the test actually requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a
substantially less restrictive alternative, a properly conceived LRA analysis can
go a long way toward securing an adequate amount of autonomy for the NCAA
to promulgate rules and regulations. The greatest difficulty in defining such a test
is making it sufficiently clear to serve as a guide to the NCAA about the
permissible scope of its regulations.5' Part II.C. will attempt to do just that.
C. Fatality of the Second Prong to the NCAA in Law
In Law v. NCAA, the plaintiffs-college basketball coaches affected by the
restricted-earnings coaches rule-met their initial burden of showing that the rule
had significant anticompetitive effects.52 This was an easy burden for the coaches
to bear, considering the nature of the restriction. As the court in Law pointed out,
the coaches could have met their burden of establishing anticomptetitve effect
either (1) "indirectly by proving that the defendant possessed the requisite market
power within a defined market,"53 or (2) "directly by showing actual
anticompetitive effects, such as control over output or price." 54 Because the rule
4 9 
"If the defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then must
prove that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate
objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner."
Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
50 See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2669 ("[Tjhe LRA doctrine would likely be the death
knell for virtually every NCAA rule.").
51 As noted supra at note 7 and accompanying text, the danger of blackmail lawsuits is
very real, especially as the sharks pick up the scent of blood in the water left by Law. An
unclear test increases the odds that plaintiffs can extract a settlement from the NCAA, which
may be justifiably unwilling to run the risk of another large verdict and the prospect of treble
damages.
52 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019-21. The coaches argued unsuccessfully that the court should
find the restricted-eamings rule illegal per se as a horizontal price restraint See id. at 1017. In
this effort, the coaches tried to distinguish Board ofRegents on the grounds that (1) the hiring of
coaches involved an input rather than an output like the one at issue in Board of Regents; and
(2) the price-fixing at issue did not involve 'Joint buying" because each school hired its own
coaches independently. See id. at 1018. The Tenth Circuit rejected both of these arguments.
53 Id at 1019.
54 Law, 134 F.3d, at 1019.
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was a bald price restriction, the coaches were able to use the second option,
making the NCAA's argument that the relevant market in the case was the entire
market for men's basketball coaching services-including coaching positions in
junior highs, high schools, NCAA Divisions II and I, and professional teams-
irrelevant 5 Some of the coaches whose salaries were limited to $16,000 by the
rule had been paid $60,000 to $70,000 before the rule went into effect 5 6
The NCAA attempted to analogize the case to Hennessey v. NCAA, 5 7 which
upheld an NCAA bylaw limiting the number of assistant coaches member
institutions could employ in a particular sport. The court in Law rejected the
analogy, noting first that the Hennessey case did not involve horizontal price
restraints, second that the plaintiffs in Hennessey could not demonstrate
anticompetitive effects because the rule had been too recently implemented, third
that Hennessey predated the Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Regents, and
fourth that Hennessey was a Fifth Circuit case and thus not binding on the Tenth
Circuit.58
Because the significant anticompetitive effect of the rule was so plain, the
burden quickly shifted to the NCAA to justify the rule with procompetitive
benefits. The NCAA offered three such benefits: retaining of entry-level
positions, reducing cost, and maintaining competitiveness. Before considering
these justifications, the Tenth Circuit professing to follow the mandate of Board
of Regents, said, "Whe only legitimate rationales we will recognize in support of
the REC Rule are those necessary to produce competitive intercollegiate
55 See id. at 1019-20 & n.12. As the court in Law noted, the Supreme Court rejected a
nearly identical argument from the NCAA in Board of Regents. See id. at 1020 (citing NCAA
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984)).
56 See Recent Case, 20 (3) ENT. L. REP. 14, available in WEsTLAW.
57 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
58 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020-21. The third point (that Hennessey predated Board of
Regents) is probably the most significant The restraints in both Law and Hennessey were
horizontal restraints on input; the only difference was that restrictions on the number of coaches
did not constitute price-fixing. Although the plaintiffs in Law did not challenge NCAA
restrictions on the number of coaches, the validity of such restrictions would seem to be in
doubt after Law, unless the courts draw a definitive line between price-fixing (which would
remain a violation of the antitrust laws) and other nonprice restraints on inputs and outputs
(which would remain within the NCAA's power to enact and enforce). Those possibilities will
be discussed. See injra Part IV.
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sports."59 It was under this formulation that the Tenth Circuit evaluated the
NCAA's offered justifications.
The court found the "retention of entry-level positions" justification lacking
for several reasons, not the least of which was that the NCAA could not produce
any facts to show that the restricted-earnings rule operated to provide such
positions. The court noted that some universities had relegated coaches with
many years of experience to the role of restricted-earnings coach. For a coach
who made $60,000 before the rule took effect a reduction in salary to $16,000
represents a pay cut of nearly 75 percent Because the evidence showed that some
coaches were in fact faced with that situation, the court recognized that the
NCAA's rationale that the REC rule would prevent some teams from hiring four
experienced coaches instead of three was disingenuous.60 As an added ground for
rejecting the rationale, the court noted that the REC rule did not "foster[ ] the
amateurism that serves as the hallmark of NCAA competition."61 Finally, the
court held that even if the REC rule did in fact allow younger, inexperienced
coaches to obtain otherwise unattainable entry-level coaching positions in
Division I programs, that argument was not legally cognizable unless the opening
of such positions had an impact on competition.62
The NCAA's second proffered justification for the rule was that it would cut
costs for financially strapped athletic programs.6 3 The fatal flaw of this argument
is that it assumes free competition for coaches will have a detrimental effect upon
the quality of the product-in this case college basketball-a line of reasoning
foreclosed by the existence of the Sherman Act itself.64 Additionally, the NCAA
argued that reducing costs could be considered procompetitive because cost
59 Law, 134 F.3d at 1021 (citing BoardofRegents, 468 U.S. at 117). Phrased as it was, the
passage suggests that this standard of necessity will be a demanding one for the NCAA to meet.
However, as noted previously, Justice Stevens' opinion in Board of Regents stated explicitly
(again, in dicta) that "most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA arejustifiable means of
fostering competition ... "' Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added). This
dichotomy between what is reasonable and what is justifiable is one of the oldest debates in the
nation's history, going back at least to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,413-15
(1819) (interpreting the meaning of the "necessary and proper clause," U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8
cl.17). As Justice Marshall said in that famous opinion, "Let the end be legitimate... and all
means which are appropriate... are constitutional." Id. at 421. The analogy to NCAA
regulations as they relate to the antitrust laws is not perfect, but some similarly expanded
version of the term "necessary" must be adopted, unless nearly every NCAA regulation is to be
invalidated, an outcome clearly not contemplated by the Supreme Court in Board ofRegents.
60 See Law, 134 F3d at 1022.
61 Id. at 1022 n.14.
62 See id. at 1021-22.
63 See id. at 1022.
64 See id. at 1022-23 ("Mhe NCAA cannot argue that competition for coaches is an evil
because the Sherman Act 'precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad.") (quoting National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,695 (1978)).
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reduction was "necessary to maintain the existence of competitive intercollegiate
sports."65 As support for this argument, the NCAA again relied on Hennessey,
and again the pre-Board ofRegents Fifth Circuit case failed to persuade the Tenth
Circuit, which parried the thrust of this argument with more language from Board
ofRegents:
[T]he REC Rule does not equalize the overall amount of money Division I
schools are permitted to spend on their basketball programs. There is no reason
to think that the money saved by a school on the salary of a restricted-earnings
coach will not be put into another aspect of the school's basketball program, such
as equipment or even another coach's salary, thereby increasing inequity in that
area.
66
Finally, the court addressed the NCAA's argument that the REC rule would
foster competitive balance among Division I basketball programs by "preventing
wealthier schools from placing a more experienced, higher-priced coach in the
position of restricted-earnings coach." 67 The court rejected this argument as well,
suggesting that even eyperienced coaches would accept a restricted-earnings
coach position at a powerhouse school like Duke or North Carolina because of the
"national prominence" of the basketball programs of those schools. 68 The fact
65 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998).
66 Id. at 1023 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118-
19 (1984)). The court in Law quoted Professor Roberts' cogent criticism of this rationale: "If
holding down costs by the exercise of market power over suppliers ... is a procompetitive
effect justifying joint conduct, then section 1 can never apply to input markets or buyer cartels.
That is not and cannot be the law." Id. (quoting Roberts, supra note 18, at 2643).67 Id. at 1024.
68 See id. at 1024 n.15. Perhaps an even more important factor than the prominence of the
school is the reputation of the particular head coach under whom the assistant serves. For
example, the coach at Duke University, Mike Krzyzewski, is well-known as a protg6 of
venerable Indiana coach Bob Knight. Because of the "good ol' boy network" that tends to be
used to fill head coaching vacancies when they arise-and because of the staggering number of
potential applicants for every position-service under a patriarch like Knight or former North
Carolina coach Dean Smith can mean the difference between attaining that first head coaching
job and toiling for years or decades more as an assistant. See, e.g., Tom Verducci et al.,
Scorecard, SPORTs ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 7, 1998, at 29:
Citing [Miami Dolphins head football coach] Jimmy Johnson's five former assistants who
became head coaches for NFL or college teams, the Dolphins' media guide trumpets
Johnson as "Coach to Coaches." But the records of his pupils... aren't nearly as
immaculate as their master's mane [Johnson is renowned for his helmet-like hairstyle,
which appears at all times to be impervious to wind, rain, and blunt objects]. No one
should confuse Johnson with, say, Bill Walsh, whose proteges have a .554 winning
percentage in the NFL.
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that the language of the NCAA rule did not require restricted-earnings coaches to
be young or inexperienced led in part to the court's conclusion that "the REC
Rule is nothing more than a cost-cutting measure and shows that the only
consideration the NCAA gave to competitive balance was simply to structure the
rule so as not to exacerbate competitive imbalance." 69
D. The Road Not Traveled: The Third Prong and Its Inherent Uncertainty
Because of the Tenth Circuit's holding that the NCAA had not met its burden
as to the second prong of the rule of reason test for antitrust violations, the court
found it unnecessary to advance to the third prong, which requires the plaintiff to
"prove that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially
less restrictive manner."70 This prong could be problematic for the NCAA
because it is a vague and unsettled area in the law, creating the potential for
stunningly broad liability (which is of course trebled under the antitrust laws)
regarding an array of NCAA rules and regulations.7 ' However, for good or ill,
tests like these are prevalent in the law,72 and their reasonable degree of
workability in other contexts suggests that they may be able to provide sufficient
clarity in this context as well.7 3
Although this example includes professional football coaches, Johnson had a long and
distinguished career as a college football coach before entering the coaching ranks in the
National Football League, and two of his protg6s-Jon Blake and Butch Davis--took over
the reins of college programs. In any event, it is illustrative of the fact that the cognoscenti of the
sports world keep track of these minutiae.
69 Law, 134 F.3d at 1024.
70 Id at 1019.
71 See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2670 ("The content of the LRA doctrine today is so
hollow that it can be used in almost any case to strike down otherwise procompetitive rules.").
72 It has been suggested that the proliferation of balancing tests is due to the increasingly
central role of timid law clerks in drafting Supreme Court opinions. See Tony Mauro, The
Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court: Justices Give Pivotal Role to Novice Lawyers, USA
TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 1A (noting that "an increasing number of scholars say that in the last
decade, because of the clerks, the court's opinions have become more timid and turgid,
lengthier and full of partial concurrences and complex balancing tests"). Whether or not this is
true (and the ancillary question of whether this is a good or bad thing) are issues well beyond
the scope of this Note. Suffice it to say that the balancing tests exist, and it is incumbent upon
the courts to solidify these doctrines to the extent possible and upon entities like the NCAA to
anticipate the outcomes of future cases based on the available case law.
73 One example of an often-used balancing test occurs in the analysis of dormant
Commerce Clause cases. The leading case is Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In
that case, a unanimous Court held: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. By contrast, facially discriminatory laws lead to
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Perhaps the most instructive analogy in an effort to provide tangible and
substantive content to the "substantially less restrictive alternative" prong of the
rule of reason is a line of cases dealing with government regulation of commercial
speech. In Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission,74 the Supreme
Court held that the government may regulate commercial speech if, inter alia, the
regulation is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve [a substantial
government] interest."'75 The '"not more extensive than is necessary" language
rightly raised the specter of a judicial test that would be virtually impossible for a
government entity to meet in its attempts to justify a restriction on commercial
speech.76 In 1989 the Court substantially quelled these fears by clarifying the test
in Board of Trustees, State University of New York v. Fox.77 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, expressly held that the Central Hudson test did not
require the government to use the "least restrictive alternative," but required only
"a 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable... that employs ... a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." 78
The third prong of an effective rule of reason analysis of antitrust laws should
seek out a golden mean between a true "least restrictive alternative" test and the
glorified rational basis test that Justice Scalia put forth in Fox.79 The reasons are
arule ofper se invalidation. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The analogy
to antitrust cases is thus a strong one, in that price-fixing is normally deemed a per se violation
of the Sherman Act (absent special circumstances), and closer cases are adjudicated under the
rule of reason, with its shifting burdens of proof and ultimate balancing of anticompetitive
effects and procompetitive benefits.
74 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
75 Id. at 566.
76 In the commercial speech context contemplated by Central Hudson, the burden remains
on the government to demonstrate that no other course of action would be less restrictive. See
id. at 564. The fact that under rule of reason analysis the burden rests with the plaintiff to
demonstrate that an alternative would be "substantially less restrictive," appears to provide a
greater degree of protection to defendants in antitrust actions.
77 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
78 Id. at 480 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
7 9 Justice Scalia's attempt to pass off Justice Powell's strongly worded statement in
Central Hudson that "if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive" as "dicta" is
singularly unconvincing. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476. His characterization of the rule he created in Fox
as "far differenf' from the rational basis test employed in the context of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is only slightly more persuasive. See id. at 480. "Slightly
distinguishable" would have been a more accurate description. All this is not to say that Justice
Scalia did not have valid reasons for limiting the Central Hudson test in a manner highly
favorable to state government After all, in Central Hudson and in Fox, the Supreme Court was
exercising its much-maligned power of judicial review-a power the Court has always used
cautiously, even sheepishly. Perhaps even 200 years later, the Court still harbors doubts about
the doctrinal validity of the famous case that imbued the Court with the power to review
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simple. Literally construed, the least restrictive alternative test could conceivably
lead to the downfall of every NCAA rule and regulation,80 while a test requiring
only a "reasonable fit," or a "means narrowly tailored" to achieve a legitimate
purpose would provide a safe harbor for any NCAA regulation that could meet
the second prong of the rule of reason. This middle-of-the-road approach would
bolster the clarity of the test, and provide redress for victims of unjustified
anticompetitive practices by the NCAA without destroying the organization
piecemeal, one bylaw at a time.81
legislation for compliance with the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803). The difference between a case like Central Hudson and one like Law is that, in the
latter situation, the Court is enforcing (in this case federal) law rather than considering whether
to invalidate it. The only thing in danger of being struck down is a rule or bylaw approved by a
private unincorporated association. Unlike statutes passed by a publicly elected body of
representatives, NCAA rules-especially those concerned with commercial activity-are not
entitled to the presumption of validity that state and federal legislation enjoy. As a result, it is
proper for courts to construct a somewhat more strenuous "least restrictive alternative' test in
the antitrust context than in cases in which state or federal laws are challenged on constitutional
grounds. To put it another way, a court finding that an agreement among members of an
unincorporated association is a "combination ... in restraint of trade or commerce" cannot give
rise to concerns of "Lochneiism," the pejorative term widely used to describe excessive judicial
scrutiny of duly enacted legislation-especially economic legislation. See Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York state law limiting the working hours of
bakery employees to 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week).
80 See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2669 ("[T]he LRA doctrine would likely be the death
knell for virtually every NCAA rule"). There are three answers to this apocalyptic forecast: (1)
there is a strong possibility that some classes of NCAA regulations will be held not subject to
antitrust scrutiny; (2) it is likely that some (if not many) NCAA regulations would be able to
withstand the first prong analysis-in other words, plaintiffs in many cases may be unable to
demonstrate significant anticompetitive effects; and (3) the 'least restrictive alternative'
language that has been used in the cases likely will be softened when the third prong is called
into practice.
81 The need for antitrust laws to apply to the NCAA cannot be underestimated, in light of
the organization's hard-nosed tactics. For example, when member schools of the CFA signed
an independent deal with NBC in 1981 for broadcast rights to games, the NCAA publicly
threatened disciplinary action against any CFA member school that complied with the contract.
See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,94-95 (1984). "The NCAA
made it clear that sanctions would not be limited to the football programs of CFA members, but
would apply to other sports as well." Id. at 95. Remember, also, that an NCAA decision to
punish say, The Ohio State University's basketball teams for the actions of the football team
would be immune from any Due Process challenge. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
If the NCAA could evade scrutiny under the antitrust laws, consumers, universities, and athletes
would be at the mercy of an autonomous organization accountable to no one. On the other
hand, a clearly defined rule of reason test could ensure that unworthy plaintiffs do not coerce
the NCAA into blackmail settlements by allowing the NCAA to be more certain as to what
kinds of rules and regulations they may legally promulgate.
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The question of what constitutes a "substantially less restrictive manner" of
regulation is admittedly a thorny one.82 However, the problem is not intractable.
Most cases of price-fixing will never reach the third prong because the NCAA
faces a formidable barrier in justifying such restraints under the second prong.83
Rules of competition and requirements for eligibility appear to be relatively safe
from invalidation, the former because the NCAA must set parameters for the size
of the field, number of players, and types of equipment allowed to be used in
order for the contests to commence at all,84 and the latter because of the NCAA's
unique position as the promoter of amateur athletic competition, a quality it uses
to differentiate itself from professional sports.85
Therefore, only the truly borderline cases will ever reach the third prong. In
those instances, it is better for individual judges to have some doctrinal leeway to
weigh the equities of the case and arrive at the proper result Professor Roberts
predicts that "we are probably doomed to a future where random challenges to
NCAA rules will succeed or fail based largely on the appeal of the plaintiffs and
the personal predilections of the judge, and where the legal doctrine is so vague
and malleable that any result is possible." 86 To a certain extent, that probably has
82 Indeed, Professor Roberts seems to suggest the problem is insurmountable. See Roberts,
supra note 18, at 2669-71 (asking thoughtful questions as to what type of showing plaintiffs
will be required to make to satisfy the third prong of the rule of reason).
83 At the same time, there must be some hypothetical case in which a restraint on output
could be justified, or there would be no point in giving the NCAA a chance to try. The rule of
reason analysis would revert to a per se rule of invalidity, an approach the Supreme Court
considered carefully and expressly rejected in NCAA v. Board of Regents. It is possible that
certain restraints on inputs and outputs-especially those that do not amount to price-fixing-
could survive rule of reason scrutiny, e.g., limits on the number of games teams are allowed to
play each season and limits on the number of coaches NCAA member schools can employ in
each sport. Those situations will be considered. See infra Part IV.
84 This appears to be the classic example of a "horizontal restraint on competition" that is
"essential if the product is to be available at all." Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. Therefore,
it is unlikely that Easton can prevail in its antitrust action against the NCAA, a topic that will be
fully discussed. See infra Part M.
85 It is relatively common knowledge that many, if not most, Division I caliber athletes
select their institution of higher leaming based primarily on the coach or school for whom they
want to play, although Justice White failed to recognize this in his dissenting opinion in Board
of Regents: "[Tjhe television plan, like the ban on compensating student-athletes, may well
encourage students to choose their schools, at least in part, on the basis of educational quality by
reducing the perceived economic element of the choice... ." Board ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 136
(White, J., dissenting). While this may have been true when the "Whizzer" chose to attend the
University of Colorado, where he starred in football and basketball, it would be difficult to say
that it is true today. Nevertheless, the NCAA continues to provide amateur competition, and
any rule that tends to preserve the amateur status of the athletes or govern the academic
standards for their admission or eligibility is necessary (or at least justifiable) for maintaining a
system of amateur athletics.
86 Roberts, supra note 18, at 2674. It is worth noting that Professor Roberts followed the
above sentence with this one to conclude his Note: "But perhaps that is not so unusual for our
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always been true in certain areas of the law and probably will continue to be so.
However, because of the strong reasons for applying antitrust laws to the
NCAA,87 and because a properly conceived rule of reason can alleviate these
concerns to a great extent 88 the problem is not insurmountable.
III. THE RULE OF REASON APPLIED TO THE EASTON AND ADIDAS SuITs
In the aftermath of the Law verdict, at least two major antitrust suits have
been filed against the NCAA, both by athletic equipment companies. Easton, a
baseball bat producer, claims that NCAA regulations set to go into effect in the
year 2000, which will require aluminum bats to perform more like wooden ones
will render obsolete the line of aluminum bats Easton currently sells. Adidas, a
shoe company, is challenging NCAA Rule 12.5.5, which limits the size of
corporate logos on team uniforms to 2.25 square inches. Adidas claims its
corporate logo will not fit into so small a space, and that the rule, therefore, is an
unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. This Part of this Note
will consider these lawsuits in turn, to consider their validity and potential impact
upon the way the NCAA regulates intercollegiate athletic competition. An
analysis under the rule of reason leaves very little chance for Easton to succeed in
its lawsuit, and Adidas' case is only slightly stronger.89
A. No Joy in Mudville °
The NCAA's new bat specifications for college baseball are scheduled to
take effect in spring 2000. The regulations are designed to make the aluminum
bats NCAA teams will use in games perform more like wooden ones, making the
game "safer and less offensive-minded."91 Easton contends that it will suffer $79
legal system." Id. The very nature of antitrust law-and indeed all types of business law-is
bound to be more vague and amorphous than, e.g., most street crime. Murder is illegal;
everyone knows it and almost anyone could define it with a reasonable degree of accuracy. But
ask 100 lay people (or 100 lawyers, for that matter) to define a combination or contract that is
an unreasonable restraint of trade and one is bound to receive 100 different answers-or at least
50 different answers and 50 blank stares.
87 See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
88 The proposed third prong will be applied to various NCAA rules. See infra Parts III, IV.
89 This is true even though Adidas has already lost on a motion for a preliminary
injunction. See Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (D. Kan. 1999).
Adidas also lost round two when the district court granted the NCAA's motion for judgment on
the pleadings. See Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 1999). The
Easton case is set to go to trial in June 2000, and Easton also apparently has sought a
preliminary injunction. See Paul Marino, Aluminum FoiLINCAA: New Rules on Bats Will
Correct the Overkill, NEWSDAY, Apr. 4, 1999, at C13.90 See generally ERNEST LAURENCETHAYER, CASEY AT THE BAT (1964).
91 Rock, supra note 7.
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million in damages due to implementation of the new specifications and seeks a
judgment for that amount threefold. According to one newspaper report
describing the amended complaint, Easton alleges that:
[It will] lose substantial sales during the 1999 season because many players will
not wish to buy bats which will shortly become obsolete .... Easton will also
suffer a significant loss of market position because its current market position is
based substantially on its competitive advantage in innovation and production of
high-quality bats, an advantage that will disappear once these bats are banned. 92
Considered under the rule of reason, as it certainly would be, this case
presents formidable problems for Easton. In fact, it is difficult to imagine this
lawsuit surviving a motion for summary judgment As an initial matter, Easton
bears the burden of demonstrating that the new rules produce unreasonable
anticompetitive effects.93 The Supreme Court in Board of Regents offered a
strong clue that challenges to NCAA rules of contest are not the type of
regulations subject to invalidation under the Sherman Act:
[T]he NCAA and its member institutions market... competition itself-contests
between competing institutions. Of course, this would be completely ineffective
if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to create and define the
competition to be marketed. A myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size
of the field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical
violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all
restrain the manner in which institutions compete. 94
It seems clear that a rule defining specifications for baseball bats tracks
92 Id. (quoting Easton's amended complaint).
93 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (noting
that the Sherman Act prohibits only "unreasonable' restraints of trade). Moreover, in the Third
Circuit (or in any other court that has adopted the Third Circuit rule), courts likely would
consider the threshold question whether federal antitrust laws are applicable to NCAA rules of
contest. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); see also supra notes 19-24 and
accompanying text (discussing the "noncommercial objective defense"). Because the objective
of such rules is to regulate the athletic contests themselves-creating a "level playing field"
perhaps even in a literal sense-there may be strong reasons not to subject such rules to
antitrust scrutiny. The NCAA's objective in passing the baseball bat regulation was
noncommercial, in stark contrast to the restricted-earnings coach rule. In Law, the NCAA
asserted "cost reduction" as a justification for the restricted-eamings coach rule. See Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 1998). This assertion, while candid, was
devastating to the NCAA's case; it basically served as an admission that the organization
employed illegal means of reducing costs under federal antitrust law.
94 Id. at 101. As noted previously, this passage is dicta. However, its prominence within
the opinion and the strength of the terms in which the passage is stated suggest that it would
take a substantial amount ofjudicial backtracking to avoid the impact of such strong language.
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closely the Supreme Court language concerning "rules on which the competitors
[have] agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed,"95 and is
highly analogous to "the size of the field 9 6 and "the number of players on a
team."97 As a practical matter, a holding that the bat regulation opposed by
Easton is an "unreasonable restraint of trade"98 forbidden by the Sherman Act
would open wide the courthouse door for any number of spurious legal challenges
to NCAA rules that must be established before there can be any product i.e.,
athletic competition, at all.99 The baseball bat regulation is a restraint of trade only
in the technical sense that every contract is a restraint of trade; it is not the type of
trade restraint the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent.100
Even assuming, arguendo, that Easton could meet its initial burden of




9 8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
99 If the NCAA may not regulate the type of bats to be used in baseball and softball
games, then why should it be allowed to limit the size of a basketball court? If Easton were to
prevail on its antitrust suit, there would be nothing to prevent hardwood basketball floor
manufacturers from winning an antitrust verdict against the NCAA based on the theory that
such a limitation is an "unreasonable restraint of trade," and that without the limitation they
would have been able to achieve greater sales and profits. Such a result would be inconsistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence which has consistently read the word "unreasonable' into
the Sherman Act to prevent literally every contract from becoming a violation. See Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 98 & n.17 (noting that the Sherman Act was designed to prohibit "only
unreasonable restraints of trade' and citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 342-43 (1982); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978); Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918)). Board of Trade
of Chicago is the seminal case. Justice Brandeis wrote the opinion in the 8-0 decision (Justice
McReynolds did not participate):
Mhe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade... restrains .... The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.
Board of Trade of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238.
100 Even Professor Roberts, whose general forecast predicted the susceptibility of large
portions of the NCAA rules, noted: "It would require an active imagination to claim that any of
the rules [of contest] violate the rule of reason." See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2648. Professor
Roberts divided all NCAA rules into six categories: structural/operational, amateurism,
academic eligibility, staff conduct, production and output, and contest. See id. at 2647-48. The
Adidas case, discussed in infra Part III.B., does not fit neatly into any of these categories, but
implicates amateurism, staff conduct, and production and output, all categories of rules which
Professor Roberts contends possess "significant anticompetitive effects." Id. at 2648.
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procompetitive benefits of the rule are likely to be sufficient for the NCAA to
carry its burden under the second prong. This is true even though the nature of the
primary procompetitive benefit is the somewhat intangible improvement to the
quality of the actual competition between NCAA baseball teams on the field of
play. When one considers that the University of Southern California defeated
Arizona State in the 1998 NCAA College World Series championship game 21-
14, in a game that saw nine home runs hit by eight different players,101 the
concern that high-tech aluminum bats have made the game too offensive-minded
appear to be legitimate.10 2 There is an additional safety justification for the bat
changes. The metal alloy bats currently in use can send the ball back toward the
pitcher at speeds of up to 113 miles per hour.103 The new bat specifications are
designed to limit that speed to 93 miles per hour,104 and it is hoped that the
difference will result in fewer injuries, especially to pitchers.' 05
B. All Day IDream About Suing
Whether the anticompetitive effects of NCAA Rule 12.5.5 are unreasonable
in the Adidas case is a closer question than in the Easton suit, and potentially
more pivotal, because if Adidas succeeds on the first prong, it will be much more
difficult for the NCAA to demonstrate procompetitive benefits of the restriction
limiting corporate logos on team uniforms to 2.25 square inches. The district
101 See Al Toby, NCAA Set to Swing at Metal Bats, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1998, at 1
(posing the question whether "improved equipment jeopardize[s] the 'integrity' of the game").
102 See, eg.,IS!, IWU Coaches Like NCAA Bat Rule: Metal Alloy Bats to Perform More
Like Wood Bats Beginning in August, 1999, THE PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Aug. 13,
1998, at B3. This article described the reaction to the game of Illinois Wesleyan baseball coach
Dennis Martel, who called the game "disgraceful," and Illinois State coach Jeff Stewart, who
saw the score flash across his television screen, but assumed it was "an old football score" See
id. (intemal quotation marks omitted).
103 See id.
104 See id.; see also John T. Dauner, Bat Maker Is SuingNCAA: Proposed Design Change
Is Considered Unfair, KAN. Crry STAR, Aug. 11, 1998, at C7.
105 See id. (quoting NCAA general counsel Elsa Cole as saying, "Scientists tell us pitchers
need A seconds to react to the ball .... The ball today [reaches] the pitcher's mound in .32
seconds.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alan Schmadtke, Going Batty,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 14, 1999, at C13. This article pointed to these incidents as evidence
of the dangerousness of the high-tech baseball bats:
Arizona State's Ryan Mills had his jaw broken by a line drive in his first career start in
1996.... Also in '96, Houston pitcher Danny Crawford needed 62 stitches to close a gash
in his face. He lost five teeth; one was found near the shortstop's area a few days
later .... Last year, two Japanese high school pitchers were killed after being struck in the




court never reached this question when it considered Adidas' motion for a
preliminary injunction; the court denied relief to Adidas based on the
noncommercial objective defense.106 Because the theoretical basis for this
judicially created exemption from antitrust scrutiny is questionable, 0 7 this Part
will proceed to analyze the regulation under the rule of reason.
Adidas argued in its motion for preliminary relief that the NCAA
"unreasonably restrained trade and engaged in a group
boycott... and... attempted to monopolize."' 1 8 Perhaps a stronger argument is
that Rule 12.5.5 will lead to a misallocation of resources10 9 in that Adidas'
advertising budget will not be spent as efficiently as it would be without the
rule.110 Adidas must make a prima facie showing of this type of anticompetitive
10 6 See Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1285 (D. Kan. 1999)
(stating that Bylaw 12.5.5 would not be scrutinized for compliance with the Sherman Act
"because the bylaw, like the eligibility rules, has neither the purpose nor the effect of giving the
NCAA or its member institutions an advantage in any commercial transaction"). The district
court dismissed Adidas' claims on the merits based on its inadequate definition of the relevant
product market. See Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (D. Kan.
1999). Because market definition is not the focus of this Note, the discussion of the Adidas suit
assumes a narrowly drawn market definition. Nevertheless, the importance of market definition
in rule of reason antitrust cases cannot be overemphasized, and lawyers on both sides of an
antitrust suit must give the issue due consideration and care.
107 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (questioning whether sports fans should be
granted greater antitrust protection than college athletes).
108
,Adidas, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1282-83. This is essentially a transfer of wealth argument.
109 As noted previously, misallocation of resources is the primary evil that section one of
the Sherman Act is designed to prevent.
110 Transfers of wealth are also widely regarded as antitrust evils. However, as Professor
Roberts points out, this proposition is not universally accepted, especially among economists.
See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2650 & n.47 ("Although the economist is generally unwilling to
say that this redistribution of wealth results in a welfare loss to society, this is probably the most
prominent reason that the public and perhaps Congress have condemned monopoly power.
From the economist's viewpoint, the greatest evil of monopoly is wasted resources.") (quoting
E. THOMAS SULLWvAN & HERpERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRusT LAW, PoLIcY AND PROCEDURE 67
(3d ed. 1994)). In the classic monopoly situation, wealth is transferred from consumers to
producers through the use of contracts or combinations in restraint of trade, i.e., price fixing,
output quotas, etc. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2650 (noting that "typical" wealth transfers
are from consumers to producers). This can readily occur when there is essentially one seller of
a product or service--a monopoly. Law represents a case in which the NCAA wielded
monopsony power, monopsony is "a condition of the market in which there is but one buyer for
a particular commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990); see also Roberts,
supra note 18, at 2643 (defining monopsony power). Thus, in Law wealth was transferred from
producers (the coaches) to consumers (member institutions of the NCAA). As Professor
Roberts notes, such a situation could actually lead to lower prices for the ultimate consumer, the
college sports fan. See id. However, Professor Roberts agues that "monopsony power is still
harmful overall to consumer welfare due to its effect of misallocating society's resources and
thus diminishing consumer choice." Id. This issue will be reconsidered briefly. See infra Part
IV, when restrictions on the number of coaches for each sport are examined.
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effect before the burden would shift to the NCAA to justify the rule by
demonstrating its procompetitive benefits.
The first prong inquiry under the rule of reason in a case like the Adidas suit
would be much more complex than the analyses of this issue in Board of Regents
or Law. Because those cases involved horizontal restraints on output (Board of
Regents) and price (Law), the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit applied a
"quick look" rule of reason analysis to find that the rules produced significant
anticompetitive effects.11 In the absence of such clearly anticompetitive conduct,
the court must engage in a searching and often tedious factual examination of
market power,1 12 which the Supreme Court in Board of Regents defined as "the
ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
market."1 3 That such an inquiry will almost certainly be required if the Adidas
case reaches trial, places the NCAA in a much stronger position than it was in
either Board ofRegents or Law.1 14 While it is impossible to predict accurately the
111 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984):
"[W]hen there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."'
(quoting National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); see also
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998):
A plaintiff may establish anticompetitive effect indirectly by proving that the
defendant possessed the requisite market power within a defined market or directly by
showing actual anticompetitive effects, such as control over output or price. A naked,
effective restraint on market price or volume can establish anticompetitive effect under a
truncated rule of reason analysis.
Id. (citations omitted).
Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is established, even
without a determination of the relevant market, where the plaintiff shows that a horizontal
agreement to fix prices exists, that the agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an
agreement is more favorable to the defendant than otherwise would have resulted from the
operation of market forces.
112 To assess market power, the court first must determine what is the "relevant market"
Normally, the court will define a "relevant product market' and a "relevant geographic
market." See, e.g., Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996).113 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n38 (1984)
(citations omitted). Of course, in monopsony situations like the one at issue in Law (and
discussed supra note 110), the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant's market power
allowed the defendant to lower prices below what they would have been in a competitive
market.
114 Because courts are likely to employ the "quick look" analysis in cases involving price-
fixing and restraints on output-which leads to a virtually automatic finding of anticompetitive
effects-it may not be readily apparent what benefit the NCAA gains from having such
regulations analyzed under the rule of reason. The major difference between a per se rule of
invalidity and the "quick look" rule of reason approach is that the latter affords the defendant
the opportunity to put forth procompetitive benefits of the restraint, while the former does not
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outcome of such an inquiry without carefully considering the facts that would be
put in issue in this case, the NCAA's position that Rule 12.5.5 creates no
significant anticompetitive effects is certainly defensible under the first prong of
the rule of reason.1 15
However, if Adidas prevails under the first prong, it will be difficult for the
NCAA to counter the anticompetitive effects of the rule with procompetitive
benefits. Based on comments made by NCAA general counsel with regard to the
Adidas suit,116 it is likely that the asserted procompetitive benefit of the rule
would be preservation of the amateurism of the college athlete.117 The problem
with this rationale is that the NCAA has already "crossed the Rubicon ' 118 by
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 320b, at 50; Jay P. Yancey, Comment, Is the
Quick Look too Quick?: Potential Problems with the Quick Look Analysis of Antitrust
Litigation, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 671,677 (1996) (noting that "[t]he per se rule does not consider
justifications or reasonableness of challenged conduct").
115The NCAA has a plausible argument that the "relevant product market" for
determination of whether the NCAA wields market power is the advertising market for athletic
shoes and apparel. Indeed, as noted supra note 89, the district court dismissed the case on
market definition grounds. This is in stark contrast to the situations that existed in Board of
Regents and Law, in which the courts basically inferred market power from the fact that the
NCAA had placed numerical limits on outputs and prices. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2638-
39. While the issue of whether the NCAA wields market power in the athletic shoes and
apparel market cannot be settled within the pages of this Note, the fact that the court will not
presume the issue against the NCAA works in the defendant's favor.
116 
"Our position is that higher education doesn't want athletes to become billboards for
commercial purposes." SEAT=LE TIMES, Nov. 14,1998, at B2 (quoting NCAA general counsel
Elsa Cole).
117 The Supreme Court in Board ofRegents gave this justification its blessing:
Mhe NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football--college football. The
identification of this "product" with an academic tradition differentiates college football
from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character
and quality of the "product," athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class,
and the like.
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984). Because the
rule struck down in Board of Regents did not implicate amateurism concerns, this passage is
dicta. It appears to have been written to provide assurance that the Court's holding would not
lead to the invalidation of all NCAA rules. The NCAA presumably would expect the
amateurism justification to do some heavy lifting in future cases challenging NCAA rules
limiting compensation for athletes, as well as eligibility rules.
1 18 In 49 B.C., Julius Caesar led his army from his province of Cisalpine Gaul across the
Rubicon, a small river in northwest Italy marking the boundary between the two provinces.
Because it was a violation of Roman law for a general to march out of his province with his
army in tow, Caesar's action made war with Pompey and the Roman Senate inevitable. See
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICIONARY 1261 (3d ed. 1996). "Thus, to 'cross the
Rubicon' is to commit oneself irrevocably to a course of action." Id.
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allowing corporations to advertise on team jerseys at all.119 If the NCAA were
truly interested in preserving the amateur character of its product, one might
expect that it would ban corporate logos completely from the uniforms of college
sports teams.120 In addition, Adidas officials have pointed out that the NCAA
markets "everything from Final Four seat cushions to commemorative key
chains," making its claims of purity "disingenuous. ' 121 Finally, it must be noted
that corporate sponsorship of college football bowl games is pervasive, damaging
any NCAA claim that it seeks to protect its athletes from serving-at least
indirectly-as corporate spokespeople. 122
119 For example, the Ohio State football team advertises Nike with a "swoosh"---the shoe
company's trademark symbol-on the front of its jerseys. NCAA regulations impose a limit of
one logo per uniform. See Steve Rock & John T. Dauner, Shoemaker Adidas Latest to Sue
NCAA, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 13, 1998, at DI. However, in addition to the Nike shoes
themselves, many players also wear Nike gloves and wrist bands, all of which also display the
swoosh logo conspicuously. This may go undetected by fans who attend the games, but those
who are watching on television or reading about their favorite teams in a newspaper or
magazine are apt to be assaulted by swooshes. It is not uncommon to see still photographs of a
single player displaying five swooshes.
120 Such a no-logo policy would advance not only the presumably valid procompetitive
effect of promoting amateurism, but might also promote "competitive equity between member
institutions in order to produce a marketable product .... " Law v. NCAA, 134 F3d 1010,
1023-24 (10th Cir. 1998). The court's implicit recognition that fostering competitive
equilibrium is an acceptable procompetitive benefit of an otherwise anticompetitive restraint
follows from the Supreme Court's language in Board of Regents agreeing that "the interest in
maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and
important...." Board ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 117. As former NCAA President Gene Corrigin
has said: "Everything the NCAA has done is to create a level playing field so the Notre Dames
and Michigans and [North Carolinas] don't win everything every year." Suggs & Lombardo,
supra note 10. Of course, allowing universities to sell advertising space on their jerseys only
serves to exacerbate the disparity between the "haves" and "have-nots." The three primary
companies currently buying such advertising space-Nike, Reebok, and Adidas-are more
likely to seek out high-profile schools whose athletic teams appear on television often. Even if
shoe companies were to make similar deals with less prolific schools, those schools would not
be able to command the same dollar amounts that the Michigans and Notre Dames of the world
collect. In short, it appears that the only procompetitive benefit the NCAA could claim for the
restriction is that of preserving amateurism, a flimsy argument to the extent that in order to
believe it, one must believe that the allowance of one small corporate logo protects the
amateurism of college athletes, but that allowing more than one logo or a larger single logo
would not.
121 Jeff Manning, Adidas Sues the NCAA to Keep Its Three Stripes on Uniforms,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 13, 1998, at BI. 'This notion that they've got their finger in the
dike against a flood of commercialism... it's sort of tough for us to listen to that with a straight
face." Id. (quoting Adidas lawyer Susheela Jayapal).
122 The Rose Bowl is the only major bowl game that has never had a corporate sponsor.
For a full listing of corporate sponsorship of bowl games, see the 1998 ESPN INFORMATION
PLEASE SPORTS ALMANAC 181-87 (1997): Fiesta Bowl (Sunkist Citrus Growers (1986-1991),
IBM OS/2 (1993-1995), Frito-Lay Tostitos chips (since 1996)); Sugar Bowl (USF&G
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Adidas' claim is novel in that most of the opinions considering alleged
antitrust violations by the NCAA dealt with claims brought by athletes or
coaches. 123 For that reason alone, the outcome of the case is difficult to predict.
But careful examination of rule of reason jurisprudence as it relates to claims
against the NCAA suggests: (1) that it will be more difficult for the plaintiff to
carry its initial burden of making out a prima facie case of significant
anticompetitive effects; 124 and (2) that if Adidas can meet this burden, it will be
difficult for the NCAA to fulfill the second prong of the test by demonstrating
procompetitive benefits.' 25 It is therefore unlikely in my view that the Adidas
case-should it go to trial-would reach the third prong. However-assuming for
the sake of argument that both the plaintiff and the defendant could meet their
initial burdens-some of the facts of the dispute make it an appropriate vehicle
for exploring how the case might be analyzed under the third prong of the rule of
reason.
The Third Circuit defined the third prong of the rule of reason in United
States v. Brown University.126 If the defendant meets its burden of showing that
the anticompetitive effects of challenged conduct are countered by the promotion
of a procompetitive objective, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the restraint is
Financial Services (1987-1995), Nokia cellular phones (since 1995)); Orange Bowl (Federal
Express (since 1989)); Cotton Bowl (Mobil Corporation (1988-1995)); Florida Citrus Bowl
(Florida Department of Citrus (since 1983), CompUSA (since 1992)); Gator Bowl (Mazda
Motors of America, Inc. (1986-1991), Outback Steakhouse, Inc. (1992-1994), Toyota Motor
Co. (since 1995)); Holiday Bowl (Sea World (1986-1990), Thrifty Car Rental (1991-1994),
Chrysler-Plymouth Division of Chrysler Corp. (since 1995)); Outback Bowl (Outback
Steakhouse, Inc. (since 1995)); Sun Bowl (John Hancock Financial Services (1986-1993));
Aloha Bowl (Jeep Eagle Division of Chrysler (since 1987)); Copper Bowl (Domino's Pizza
(1990-91), Weiser Lock (since 1992)); Liberty Bowl (St. Jude's Hospital (since 1993));
Carquest Bowl (Blockbuster Video (1990-1993) (game was then called the Blockbuster Bowl),
Carquest Auto Parts (since 1993)); Independence Bowl (Poulan/Weed Eater (since 1990));
Peach Bowl (Chick-fil-A (since 1998)). The Las Vegas Bowl is a minor bowl game that never
has had corporate sponsorship. Nevertheless, from the above it is apparent that it is the
exception rather than the rule.
123 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (coach brought suit); NCAA v. Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (two member universities); Smith v.
NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998) (volleyball player); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th
Cir. 1998) (coaches); Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996) (football
players); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1991) (football player); McCormack v.
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (alumni, football players, and cheerleaders); Hennessey
v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (coaches); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (football player); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (football
players); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975) (hockey player).
124 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
125 Seesupra notes 116-22 and accompanying text
126 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
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not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective." 127 In considering
whether a restraint is "reasonably necessary," the court must "examine first
whether the restraint furthers the legitimate objectives, and then whether
comparable benefits could be achieved through a substantially less restrictive
altemative." 128
The limiting word "substantially" in the just-quoted formula is the key to the
analysis. Without it, the plaintiff's burden becomes ethereal, easily cast aside by
any of an infinite number of hypothetical alternatives that are marginally less
restrictive than the rule at issue. For example, Adidas could suggest that the
NCAA adjust its size limitation for corporate logos from 2.25 square inches to 12
square inches-or whatever size is large enough to accommodate Adidas'
design-and that the NCAA increase the number of allowable corporate marks
per uniform from 1 to 2.129 If the third prong literally required the "least
restrictive alternative" that would achieve the procompetitive benefit successfully
asserted by the defendant in the second prong,130 the line-drawing problem in a
case like this-in which the NCAA has precisely chosen a size limit on corporate
marks-becomes insurmountable, and the plaintiff is virtually assured of
127 Id. at 669.
12 8 Id. at 679. The Tenth Circuit in Law incorporated nearly identical language into its
opinion. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F3d 50,
56 (2d Cir. 1997)); Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319; Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F3d
1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996); Brown, 5 F.3d at 669). The cases generally are not illuminating. In
Brown, the Third Circuit offered a modicum of further guidance, restating the third prong issue
as: "[WIhether the Antitrust Division has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
another viable option, perhaps the free market, can achieve the same benefits ... ." Brown, 5
F.3d at 679. The Ninth Circuit in Hairston reached the third prong of the rule of reason test, but
the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument in one paragraph. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319.
The plaintiffs were University of Washington football players who sued the Pacific 10 athletic
conference for antitrust violations after the conference levied sanctions against the school for
recruiting violations. The sanctions included a ban on bowl games. The plaintiffs sought
damages for "the cost of air fare, lodging, meals, and expenses related to a trip to play in a post-
season bowl game." Id. at 1317.
The athletes claim that the Pac-10's penalties were grossly disproportionate to
[Washington's] violations. However, they do not offer even the thinnest reed of support for
this proposition .... Robert Aronson, a law professor... testified that the penalties were
within the range of appropriate penalties.
Id. at 1319.
129 Adidas has two readily recognizable trademarks: a three-stripe logo and a smaller
pyramid-shaped mark. See Manning, supra note 121. According to the NCAA, the shoe
company has designed team uniforms that use both the smaller mark and the three-stripe
insignia, the latter of which is draped over a shirt sleeve or pant leg. See id. Thus, the Adidas
uniforms violate both the I logo per uniform policy and the 2.25-inch size limitation.
130 In this case, that procompetitive benefit would necessarily be preservation of
amateurism. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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winning. 131 Although it is impossible to articulate an entirely unambiguous
standard, it seems that the mere allowance of a slightly larger logo or an
additional logo would not be "substantially less restrictive," and arguably would
in any event incrementally reduce the scope of the procompetitive benefit proven
by the defendant in the second prong of the rule of reason analysis.'
32
IV. THE NCAA, LIKE THE TRAVELER, MUST BE READY FOR THE
MORROW
1 33
In the wake of the NCAA's $54.5 million settlement with former restricted-
earnings coaches after the Law verdict, the venerable organization finds itself
surveying a threatening legal horizon. The Easton and Adidas lawsuits could
signal the beginning of a broad wave of antitrust actions challenging nearly every
regulation in the NCAA Manual. 134 In addition, the NCAA increasingly is being
hauled into court to defend against other federal claims in connection with the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), workers' compensation, Title IX,
and federal civil rights legislation.135 This darkening legal landscape raises two
questions: (1) Can the NCAA survive?, and (2) If not, should anyone mourn its
demise?
A. How Many More Plaintiffs Want to Play "'Monopoly"?
As noted previously, the NCAA enjoyed a judicial cloak of immunity from
federal antitrust law for decades. 136 Now that the restricted-earnings coaches have
drawn first blood, it would not be surprising to see an intense volley of new
antitrust lawsuits being filed against the NCAA. The pool of potential plaintiffs
includes coaches, universities, student-athletes, and-as evidenced by the Adidas
and Easton suits-even corporations whose products are used by the participants
131 Conversely, if courts apply the analysis similar to Justice Scalia's rational basis-like
least restrictive alternative test in Board of Trustees, State University of New York v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469 (1989), the NCAA is likely to win every time. See supra notes 77-79 and
accompanying text.
132 For an example of an NCAA regulation that could be found invalid under the third
prong, see injfra Part IV.B., considering NCAA limits on the number of games per season in
particular sports.
133 "The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow' BENAMiN N. CARDOZO,
THm GROXVrH OF ThE LAW 20 (1924).
134 See, e.g., Suggs & Lombardo, supra note 10. "'It [the Law verdict] will make people
think about using the antitrust argument against the NCAA, and it could have serious
implications and a negative impact on the NCAA."' Id. (quoting Glenn Wong, an attorney and
director of the sports management program at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst).
135 For a brief examination ofthese developments, see infra Part IV.B.
136 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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in collegiate sports. If the NCAA is to survive such an onslaught, it must
objectively evaluate its existing rules for antitrust violations and exercise extreme
caution in promulgating new regulations.
1. Restrictions on the Number of Games Teams May Play Each Season
The strong language in Board of Regents and Law condemning price and
output restrictions makes NCAA limits on the number of games teams can play in
a season 137 a prime target for antitrust attack. In all likelihood, this "naked
restriction on... output' 138 is itself enough for a plaintiff challenging the
regulation to meet its burden ofproof as to the first prong of the rule of reason.139
As to the second prong, the NCAA likely would assert the promotion of
amateurism as a procompetitive benefit justifying the restraint.140 Assuming this
is a valid benefit, 141 the NCAA would be required to show at least that the rule
"enhances competition"'142 or at most that it is "necessary to produce competitive
intercollegiate sports."'1 4 3
137 See NCAA CONST. art.17.01.1, fig.17-1, reprinted in NCAA, 1999-00 NCAA
DMSIoN I MANUAL (Vanessa L. Abell ed., 1999) (defining maximum number of games a team
may play in each sport and setting season starting and ending dates) (cited in Roberts, supra
note 18, at 2652 n.50).
138 NCAA v. Board of Regents ofthe Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
139 See id. (noting that "no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character" of an agreement not to compete in terms of output) (citations
omitted).
140 The NCAA could also argue that the restriction enhances competitive balance among
teams by preventing some schools from scheduling extra games, while teams from other
schools may be unable to do so. This argument could be valid to the extent that the
"powerhouse' schools scheduled games only amongst themselves. However, highly ranked
schools with dominant programs in football and men's basketball often schedule weaker teams
early in the season, and those weaker teams share in the gate receipts. The practice has earned
some smaller Division I football programs reputations as "mercenaries," notably the University
of Akron, which more than once has played sacrificial lamb to mighty Nebraska in exchange
for an infusion of cash. Samuel Chi, National Championship Picture Refuses to Become Crystal
Clear, S.F. EXAMiNER, Oct. 14, 1996, at D2.
141 This assumption has been questioned. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 18, at 2662
(noting that "if the public really did prefer college football played by students who only have to
play eleven or twelve games a year, instead of fourteen games, or twenty games, there would be
no need for a rule").
14 2 Board ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 104.
143 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998). The seemingly less strenuous
requirement in Board of Regents that the defendant merely show that the restraint "enhances
competition" seems preferable. The way the test was phrased in Law, the second prong is
subsumed by the third. This is unfair to the defendant in an antitrust action because it is
ultimately the plaintiff's burden under the third prong to prove that a restraint is not reasonably
necessary. To use an analogy to Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court in
[Vol. 61:399
NCAA 'S ANTITURSTSUIT WOES
At this point in the analysis, judicial inertia favors the NCAA. A blanket
declaration that the preservation of the amateur character of college athletes is not
a sufficient procompetitive benefit to justify some restrictions as to the length of
college athletic seasons would effectively annihilate the NCAA as a governing
body. Regardless of how sound the theoretical underpinnings of such a decision
might be,144 it is an unlikely scenario-at least in the near future. However, even
assuming that some limitations on the length of athletic seasons may be upheld, it
may be that not all such limitations will be valid under the third prong of the rule
of reason. A fact-based analysis leads one to the conclusion that a limit on the
number of games may be permissible as to sports like basketball, which require
mid-week travel and a high volume of games over the course of a five-month
season, while such a limit may be impermissible as to a sport like football, in
which all games are played on Saturdays during a roughly three-month season.145
Board ofRegents seems to have prescribed intermediate scrutiny, while the tenth Circuit in Law
appears to be applying strict scrutiny. The difference between the two approaches could easily
be dispositive. On the other hand, the court in Law at least devoted lip service to the notion that
"courts should afford the NCAA plenty of room under the antitrust laws to preserve the amateur
character of intercollegiate athletics." Id at 1022 n.14 (citation omitted).
144 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 35, at 260-61:
It is time that we recognize the NCAA's amateur rules for what they are: a direct-
restraint on price competition. The NCAA rules do not require amateurism, they require a
limitation on pay. They are a cost savings device. The NCAA invokes the shibboleth of
amateurism and the public and judiciary bob their heads. This is nonsense.
Everyone cherishes the athletes of the world who, like Emie Banks, would love
nothing more than to "play two." We prefer to believe athletes play for the love of the
game. There is something pure about that. No one really believes this is true in major
college athletics anymore. But there is a feeling that if we pretend it is true, if we believe
hard enough, we can make it true.
Id.
145 In other words, the NCAA limitation on the length of the football season itself without
a limitation on the number of games that could be played during that season would be
substantially less restrictive without reducing the procompetitive benefit of the restriction in any
way. College football teams do not "get a week off' from practice when there is no game the
following Saturday. Even when college football teams have away games, they will rarely miss
class because their flights will not depart until Friday afternoon. Conversely, once the regular
season begins, basketball teams generally play on a week night at least once a week. Thus, any
road games scheduled during the school week will generally require players to miss class. See,
e.g., Mark R Whitmore, Note, Denying Scholarship Athletes Workers Compensation: Do
Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 763, 791 & n.184 (1991) (discussing
the high number of classes basketball players miss because of road trips).
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2. Restrictions on the Number of Coaches Schools May Hire
NCAA restrictions on the number of coaches schools can employ for each
sport 146 are even more problematic for the NCAA because they are nearly
indistinguishable from the restricted-earnings coaches rule struck down in Law.
The only difference is that the REC rule was a horizontal price restraint, while
NCAA restrictions on the number of coaches a school may hire are properly
classified as horizontal nonprice restraints on inputs. This difference is probably
insignificant in terms of antitrust analysis. 147 After all, it would be inconsistent to
hold that the NCAA may not allow member schools to hire a third assistant coach
subject to a $16,000 salary cap, but that it may prohibit schools from hiring a third
assistant coach entirely. In short, the anticompetitive effects of the restriction are
likely to be deemed significant, and the NCAA's burden of proving that the
restriction bolsters competitive balance among member schools 148 will be
146See NCAA CONST. art.11.7, reprinted in NCAA, 1999-00 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL (Vanessa L. Abell ed., 1999). For example, NCAA football teams are limited to a
head coach, nine assistants, and two graduate assistants. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2652
n.51 (discussing NCAA limits on the number of coaches a school can employ in each sport).
147 The restricted-earnings coaches in Law attempted to distinguish their case from Board
of Regents-in an effort to convince the court to apply a per se rule of illegalit--by arguing
that Board ofRegents involved a restraint on outputs, while the REC rule represented a restraint
on inputs. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1018. The court rejected this contention, stating:
Board of Regents does not turn on whether the agreement in question is based on input
components or output products. Rather, Board of Regents more generally concluded that
because horizontal agreements are necessary for sports competition, all horizontal
agreements among NCAA members, even those as egregious as price-fixing, should be
subject to a rule of reason analysis.
Id. at 1018-19. If anything, the NCAA's argument is marginally strengthened by the absence of
restraints on price or outputs in the case of limits on the number of coaches that may be
employed (by comparison, the REC rule was a price restraint on inputs, and thus inherently
anticompetitive). As the Supreme Court said in Board of Regents: "[T]he [NCAA television]
plan is inconsistent with the Sherman Act's command that price and supply be responsive to
consumer preference." NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110
(1984) (emphasis added); see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1021 (noting that an NCAA rule limiting
the number of coaches that could be hired in a particular sport "did not involve a naked
restriction on price" and therefore could not control the decision of a case involving price
restraints). Thus, whether this restraint on inputs creates substantial anticompetitive effects is a
closer factual question. For an excellent explanation of the argument that it does create such
anticompetitive effects, see Roberts, supra note 18, at 2653-54. "By not allowing a school's
football program to employ fifteen coaches ... the NCAA essentially deprives each program of
the opportunity to create a team that plays at a higher level of athletic performance." Id. at 2653.
148 There of course can be no argument that a restriction aimed at coaches promotes the
amateur character of the athletes. In addition, one would assume the NCAA will never again be
so foolish as to proffer cost reduction as a procompetitive benefit. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022-
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difficult to meet.149 The NCAA should rescind its limits on the number of
coaches a school may hire in particular sports before it finds itself staring down
the barrel of another massive class action lawsuit.150
3. Dred Scott in a Letter Jacket?151
NCAA rules limiting student-athlete compensation 52 are clearly price-fixing
agreements with significant anticompetitive effects.153 However, these rules are
of a decidedly different character than the ones struck down in Board of Regents
and Law because, unlike the rules found illegal in those two cases, restrictions on
athletes allow the NCAA to play its trump card, preservation of amateurism as a
procompetitive benefit' 54 Additionally, some courts have employed the
23.
149 See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1024 ("Nowhere does the NCAA prove that the salary
restrictions enhance competition, level an uneven playing field, or reduce coaching
inequities!"). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the NCAA would go about proving that a
nine coach limit would enhance competition in any way. At the same time, it seems unlikely
that any one team could gain a significant competitive advantage over other teams simply by
hiring one more or even five more coaches. At some point incapable of precise definition, it is
likely that there would be too many coaches, and the additions would be counterproductive.
150 It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of an NCAA regulation
limiting the number of assistant coaches in Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
The Tenth Circuit in Law declined to follow Hennessey for a number of reasons, including the
fact that Hennessey predated Board of Regents. See Law, 134 F3d at 1021. An even better
reason would have been that the court in Hennessey appeared not to possess even a rudimentary
understanding of federal antitrust law. "[The rule] was... intended to be an 'economy
measure ....' In this sense it was both in design and effect one having commercial impact But the
fundamental objective in mind was to preserve and foster competition in intercollegiate athletics-by
curtailing... potentially monopolistic practices by the more powerful ...." Hennessey, 564 F.2d at
1153. This blind acceptance of the NCAA's justifications for its rules and regulations was not
followed by the Supreme Court in Board ofRegents, and it certainly was not adhered to in Law.
While Hennessey has not been overruled, it is highly doubtful that it remains good law.
151 Conservative political pundit and baseball history hobbyist George F. Will has called
Curt Flood-the former St. Louis Cardinals' star who took his case for free agency to the
Supreme Court and lost---'Dred Scott in spikes." GEORGE F. WILL, BUNTS 276-79 (1998); see
also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
152 See generally NCAA CONST. arts. 12, 15, 16, reprinted in NCAA, 1999-00 NCAA
DMIsoN I MANUAL (Vanessa L. Abell ed., 1999) (providing rules requiring amateur status for
the maintenance of eligibility, dealing with financial aid a student-athlete may receive, and
limiting other compensation).
153 See Roberts, supra note 18, at 2650 (arguing that the extent to which these rules create
"wealth transfers" and "misallocations of resources" would be difficult to prove, but that the
inherently anticompetitive nature of a fixed wage agreement would be enough for plaintiffs to
meet their burden under the first prong of the rule of reason).
154 This justification was not available to the NCAA in Board of Regents or Law because
those cases did not involve direct regulation of the athletes themselves.
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"noncommercial objective defense" to find that federal antitrust laws do not apply
to NCAA eligibility and amateurism rules for student athletes.155
It blinks reality to suggest that NCAA rules limiting athlete compensation
have as their focus "noncommercial objectives."'156 It would be more accurate to
say that these rules have a noncommercial component-the preservation of the
amateur status of the athletes-and a commercial component-the cost savings
that are realized vis-i-vis a free market system in which each school would
engage in open bidding for athletes. Because there is a significant commercial
element to the athlete compensation rules, they should be subject to federal
antitrust law. The rule of reason is specifically designed to weigh a particular
restraint of trade's anticompetitive effects against its procompetitive benefits, and
if such benefits are present, to consider whether the same benefits can be achieved
in a significantly less restrictive manner.
It is of course unclear what effect, if any, the Law verdict will have on future
antitrust suits that athletes file against the NCAA. 157 However, the availability to
155 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. A federal court in Tennessee used the
noncommercial objective defense to reject a Vanderbilt University football player's antitrust
challenge to the NCAA's "no-drafr' rle, which declares that an athlete loses his college
eligibility if he enters a professional draft or hires an agent to negotiate a professional contract.
See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); see also NCAA CONST. arts.
12.1.1(f), 12.2A.2, 12.3.1, reprinted in NCAA, 1999-00 NCAA DIVIsION I MANUAL (Vanessa
L. Abell ed., 1999). The court purported to draw a distinction between "commercial" and
"noncommercial" rules, saying:
[O]ne type, exemplified by the rules in Hennessey... and Jones [v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1975)] ... is rooted in the NCAA's concern for protection of amateurism;
the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic purpose [citing
Board ofRegents].
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743 (quoting Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Jones involved an antitrust challenge to an NCAA rule
declaring ineligible anyone who had ever been paid to play a sport. See Jones, 392 F. Supp. at
296-97, 299 n.4. This analysis is startlingly flaccid. There is no basis for the claim that the rule
at issue in Hennessey concerned noncommercial objectives, other than the self-dependent
assertion to that effect made by the Fifth Circuit itself in Hennessey. See supra note 150. After
reaching the conclusion that antitrust laws did not apply to the 'no-draft" rule, the court said the
rule was not a violation of the antitrust laws even assuming those laws did apply. See Gaines,
746 F. Supp. at 746.
156 The noncommercial objective defense is more plausible with regard to NCAA rules
governing academic standards and grade-related eligibility regulations.
157 This is because courts may continue to dispose of such cases on the basis of the
noncommercial objective defense (a practice which should have been foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Regents, but which remained open in part because of the
Court's dicta assuming that most NCAA regulations are valid), and because it is unclear to what
extent the preservation of amateurism can be claimed as a procompetitive benefit. See Roberts,
supra note 18, at 2660-61.
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the NCAA of the anateurism justification, and the courts' history of complicity in
protecting sports organizations from the full force of antitrust law, 158 make it
unlikely that the basic structure of college sports will be overturned judicially in
the near future.159 A better-defined third prong of the rule of reason, as proposed
in Part I.D. of this Note, may embolden the courts to examine NCAA eligibility
and amateurism rules in a principled way that will both protect student-athletes
from egregious antitrust behavior and preserve NCAA rules that are necessary if
there is to be intercollegiate athletic competition at all. Whatever jurisprudence
develops in this area, to allow the NCAA to escape the inquiry completely-
based on the legal fiction that eligibility rules have "noncommercial objectives"-
amounts to an abdication of the judiciary's duty to apply and administer the laws
enacted by Congress.
B. Litigators at the Gate
The litigious assault against the NCAA has opened on other fronts as well.
Before the Law verdict the greatest perceived threat to the continued existence of
college sports had been Title IX-the gender equity provision of the Education
Amendments of 1972.160 As initially enacted, the statutory language did not
specifically mention the applicability of Title IX to collegiate athletics.16 1
Congress later adopted an amendment "requiring the Secretary of Health,
158 Part I of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1977), is a
classic example. Blackmun wrote, "It is a century and a quarter since the New York Nine
defeated the Knickerbockers 23 to 1 on Hoboken's Elysian Fields June 19, 1846, with
Alexander Jay Cartwright as the instigator and the umpire." Id at 260-61. Later in Part I,
Blackmun listed the names of nearly 90 baseball superstars, then apologized in a footnote to
other players he may have inadvertently omitted. See id. at 263 n3. The opening portion of the
majority opinion was so laden with nostalgia that two of the concurring Justices (White and
Burger) refused to join it See id. at 285 (White, J., concurring in all but Part I; Burger, C.J.,
concurring in all but Part 1). Chief Justice Burger essentially conceded that the Court's decision
was the wrong one. He explained his acquiescence by placing the onus on Congress to clean up
the mess. See id. at 285-86.
159 The argument that NCAA controls on student-athletes do violate the antitrust laws has
been forcefully and cogently made. See generally Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 23;
Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawfid Restraint of the
Student-Athlete, 26 Loy. LA. L. REy. 1213 (1993); Goldman, supra note 35; Roberts, supra
note 18; Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1299 (1992). Many of these authors' arguments are persuasive; they also are not worth much to
potential plaintiffs until courts start paying attention to them.
160 Title IX provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. .. " 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1994).
161 See Darryl C. Wilson, Title L['s Collegiate Sports Application Raises Serious
Questions Regarding the Role of the NCAA, 31 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 1303, 1305 (1998).
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Education and Welfare (HEW) to publish regulations implementing Title IX into
intercollegiate athletics."' 162 The Supreme Court first examined the applicability
of Title IX to university athletic programs in Grove City College v. Bell.163 One
commentator summed it up by stating that "[t]he Court held that Title IX applied
only to 'athletic programs' directly receiving federal assistance, and not to all
athletic programs at institutions who receive federal fumds." 164 The practical
effect of this decision was to negate Title IX as a vehicle for increasing
opportunities in college sports for women. 165
The perceived need for women's equality in collegiate athletics has been
fiercely debated, resisted, and even ridiculed.166 However, a review of the grim
facts suggests legislative action of some type was needed. 167 Congress responded
to the Supreme Court's narrow construction of Title IX-at least in the athletics
162 See id. (discussing adoption of the Javits amendment). Senator John Tower of Texas,
apparently sensing the negative implications the new statutory scheme would have for college
football, had earlier introduced his own amendment which would have exempted money-
making sports, i.e., football and men's basketball, from the coverage of the statute. See id. at
1305 n.14; John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College
Sports?, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 191, 216 (1996) (arguing that "[r]ejection of the
Tower Amendment rather strongly implies that Congress did not embrace the notion that
women's sports were entitled to only a contingent status").
163 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
164 Wilson, supra note 161, at 1305.
165 See id.
166 Professor Weistart has remarked on the startling openness with which gender equity
has been attacked in the high school and college sports context. Grant Teaff, former Executive
Director of the American Football Coaches Association, is quoted as saying, "I have seen the
enemy eyeball to eyeball, and I can tell you that they're out to get the game of football."
Weistart, supra note 162, at 193 (quoting Ken Stephens, Coaches Fear Title IXLawsuits May
Prove Damagingfor Football, DALLAS MORNING NaVs, Jan. 10, 1995, at 9B).
For a more outrageous statement, see id. at 226 n.1 15 (quoting Ken Burger, Opinions:
Women's Basketball, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 11, 1995, at 4):
A Charleston, South Carolina newspaper editor, had these comments on women's
basketball: "The fact of the matter is that this is intramural stuff .... [W]atching two
women post up in the paint is too closely akin to tavern mud wrestling than most of us
would like to admit Why women themselves ever thought that this was a good sport for
them to play is puzzling to me.... [Wjhat I've said is the truth, and behind closed doors,
every athletic director in the country agrees with me."
Weistart, supra note 162, at 226 n.1 15.
167 See id. at 199-200. For example, at the University of Illinois, men's swimming was
begun as a varsity sport in 1911; the women's swim team was added in 1982. See id. at 199
n.29 (citing Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237, 239 (C.D. Ill. 1993)). Louisiana
State began intercollegiate athletic competition in 1893 with football and men's baseball; LSU
had no women's sports until 1977. See id. (citing Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F.
Supp. 892,901 (M.D. La. 1996)).
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context-by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA),168 which
essentially overruled the Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell.1 69
Judicial developments following passage of the CRRA have spelled "the
beginning of the end of male-dominated collegiate sports."' 70 This has meant
hard financial times and agonizing decisions in the athletic departments of many
universities,171 but recently the NCAA itself has been drawn into the fray. The
Supreme Court in NCAA v. Smith held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from
member institutions which receive federal funds does not make the NCAA a
recipient of federal funds within the meaning of Title ]X.172 However, the Court
remanded the case for a consideration of whether the NCAA can be bound by
Title IX based on (1) federal financial assistance the NCAA receives directly and
indirectly through the National Youth Sports Program the NCAA administers; or
(2) the theory that NCAA member institutions' ceding of controlling authority
over federally funded programs to the NCAA makes the NCAA a recipient of
federal funds. 173
The Title IX controversy is only the most prominent of a number of questions
the NCAA faces in terms of the applicability of federal law to the organization
and its member institutions. Others include student-athlete claims for workers'
168 Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 908, 102 Stat. 28, 28-29 (1988) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1687 (1999).
169 See Wilson, supra note 161, at 1306 (noting that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 modified Title IX by adding language expressly declaring that "an institution-wide
approach was the proper basis for determining if violations were present').
170 Id. (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.. 1992), aff'd in part' 101
F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), as the leading case). Since Cohen v. Brown, hundreds of suits have
been filed and settlements reached, with the complainant winning nearly every time. See id.
Defendant universities have little chance of winning when "substantial proportionality" is
required between the percentage of women in the student body and the percentage of women
competing in sports. See Weistart, supra note 162, at 192 & n.6. That proportionality exists at
only "a handful of schools." Id. at 192. This is due largely to the fact that Division I football
teams are allowed to have 85 players on scholarship-normally all men-and no women's
sport is allowed an even remotely similar number.
171 The general assumption has been that cuts in men's sports offerings at many
universities have been designed to equalize scholarships between men and women and to free
up money for women's athletic teams. See Weistart, supra note 162, at 195 n.15 (noting, e.g.,
that the number of NCAA men's gymnastics programs fell from 138 in 1976 to 31 in 1996; that
120 schools dropped men's wrestling in 10 years; that 65 men's swimming teams have been cut
since 1985) (citations omitted). However, Professor Weistart also points out that the number of
collegiate wrestling teams fell from 370 to 265 from 1982-1993, "when Title IX enforcement
was virtually non-existent." Id. Thus, it is not clear what role, if any, strict enforcement of Title
IX has played in the loss of men's college athletic programs. It is undisputed that football and
men's basketball are the only sports at most universities that bring in more money than they
spend. See id. at 205,226 n.1 16.




compensation 174 and at least one challenge to NCAA academic admissions
standards based on civil rights laws. 175 The very survival of the NCAA is
contingent upon expertly navigating these legal mine fields by (1) complying with
federal law as an initial matter, (2) recognizing valid claims as they arise and
settling them out of court, and (3) continuing to defend against spurious claims
vigorously.
C. Can the NCAA Survive?
All of the aforementioned external pressures currently being applied to the
NCAA raise serious questions about the continuing viability of the
organization.' 76 However, before one gets misty-eyed for the NCAA and the
good old days when the organization was basically free from any oversight from
any source whatsoever, it may be useful to examine briefly a few recent instances
of misguided legal strategies and unmitigated arrogance on the NCAA's part that
have helped place the NCAA in its present predicament.
There is no better place to start than the Law case itself. Staring down a class
action antilrust challenge to a rule that was a clear horizontal price-fixing
arrangement, the NCAA refused to settle. According to one of the plaintiffs'
lawyers, the coaches harmed by the REC rule "would have settled in the $5
million range as late as May 1995." 177 Now, the NCAA's liability-pursuant to
174 See, e.g., University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. Ct. App. 1953);
Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct App. 1983); see generally
Whitmore, supra note 145, at 776-83 (discussing these cases and others involving workers'
compensation claims by scholarship athletes). The author commends the NCAA for
"permit[ting] schools to provide permanent disability insurance as a part of their grant-in-aid
[and for] allow[ing] 'medical hardship' cases which enable universities to continue to provide
athletic scholarships to those athletes who are physically unable to perform." Id. at 797
(footnote omitted). However, he criticizes the NCAA for not requiring member schools to
provide workers' compensation or disability insurance for injuries suffered "in the course of
fulflling scholarship obligations." Id. at 799; see also Sean Alan Roberts, Comment, College
Athletes, Universities, and Workers' Compensation: Placing the Relationship in the Proper
Context by Recognizing Scholarship Athletes as Employees, 37 S. TEx. L REV. 1315 (1996).
175 See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that the use
of standardized test scores such as the ACT and SAT in determining fist-year eligibility of
college athletes violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Steve Rock, NCAA Lawyers
Face Another Legal Battle, KAN. CrIY STAR, Oct. 13, 1998, at C3 (describing a lawsuit filed by
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice).
176 See, e.g., Sean Horgan, Storm Clouds Will Follow NCAA to New Hometown,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al. "Will the organization that arrives [in Indianapolis]
remain the seat of power for college athletics, or will it be stripped down and weakened by the
changing landscape of college sports, a landscape that continually blurs the line between
commercialism and academic mission?" Id.
177 Big Loss for the NCAA a $67 Million Blunder?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 18, 1998,
at 26 (quoting attorney Dennis Cross) (intemal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Big Loss].
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the settlement reached in March-is nearly $55 million.178 Many member
schools urged the NCAA to settle the case rather than pursue an appeal before the
Tenth Circuit.179 But the NCAA was slow to make a serious attempt at
settlement. In the fall of 1998 the NCAA made a $44 million settlement
offer180-- roughly half of what it owed the coaches, including interest and
attorneys' fees. Apparently, NCAA leaders believed the Tenth Circuit would
substantially reduce the damages award.181 Not everyone shared this optimism.
Said Kansas State President Jon Wefald, "This has been an example of arrogance
on the part of the NCAA .... When it comes to the law, arrogance will always
get you in trouble."182
Such arrogance might be forgivable if the restricted-eamings coaches case
were an isolated incident. It is not. One need look no firther than the Smith case
to see another glaring example. Renee Smith played intercollegiate volleyball at
St. Bonaventure for two seasons. Because of a rigorous course schedule, she
graduated in two and one-half years.183 She then enrolled in an M.B.A. program
at Hofstra University, where she wanted to continue to play volleyball. 184 The
NCAA has a 'Postbaccalaureate Bylaw," which prevents graduate students from
playing college sports at any institution other than the one at which they earned
their undergraduate degrees. 185 The NCAA denied requests for a waiver of the
rule by Hofstra University and the University of Pittsburgh, schools Smith
Apparently, NCAA attorneys did not advise the NCAA of the likelihood that the REC rule was
an antitrust violation. See id. This oversight was not lost on University of Texas Athletic
Director DeLoss Dodds, who said, "[The verdict] makes you wonder about the law firm who
we're getting advice from." Gilbert, supra note 8 (quoting DeLoss Dodds) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
17 8 See Schools React to Ruling Against NCAA, supra note 4.
179 See, e.g., Jack Carey & Dick Patrick, Supreme Court Decision May Speed NCAA
Settlement, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 1998, at 12C (quoting University of Kansas Athletic Director
Bob Frederick).
180 See id. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Law case should have removed
most of the disincentive for a settlement, especially from the NCAA's perspective. Interest on
the $67 million judgment is accruing at a high rate of interest. See Judge Adds to Coaches'
Award, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1999, at 1IC.
181 See Carey & Patrick, supra note 179 ("We have a high level of confidence in our
appeal to the 10th Circuit .... We think there were mistakes made in the damages trial that had
an effect on the jury's ability to hear our arguments and we think there's a good chance the
court will agree that mistakes were made.") (quoting NCAA spokesperson Wally Renfro).
182 Big Loss, supra note 177 (quoting Jon Wefald) (intemal quotation marks omitted); see
also Andrew Bagnato, NCAA Finishes Offa Moving Experience, CHI. TRiB., July 27, 1999, at 4
(referring to the NCAA's "trademark arrogance").
183 See High Court to Hear NCAA Sex Lawsuit, FLA. TODAY, Jan. 18, 1999, at 9A.
184 See id. She then decided to go to law school at the University of Pittsburgh and wanted
to play volleyball there as well. See id.
185 See Recent Case, 20 (5) ENTL. REP., October 1998, at 20.
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attended after graduating from St. Bonaventure. 186 Smith sued, alleging the
Postbaccalaureate Bylaw was a violation of antitrust law and Title IX.187 The
basis of Smith's Title IX claim is that she was denied a waiver because she is a
woman.188 Regardless of the merits of the suit, it is clear that the NCAA could
have avoided this litigation-with its potential for the attachment of new
obligations and liabilities upon the organization 189-by simply granting Smith
her waiver.
These are only two of the more egregious examples of the NCAA's
institutional arrogance and its unfair treatment of coaches and athletes. 190 It
appears that some NCAA member institutions are taking notice and, combined
with the frustration of seeing their annual disbursements from the NCAA
shrinling-in large part because of the Law verdict1 9 1-some schools apparently
are contemplating a defection.1 92 Indiana University English professor Murray
Sperber foresees such a defection, saying, "Fifteen or 20 years from now, I could
see the glamour teams of college sports leaving [the NCAA] to run their own
super-conferences while the NCAA and Indianapolis will be left to host swim
186 See High Court to HearNCAA Sex Lawsuit, supra note 183.
187 See id.
188 See id.
18 9 Of course, the NCAA does not overfly claim that it should not comply with gender
equity efforts. NCAA spokesperson Wally Renfro explained:
The important legal argument here for us is not whether the NCAA should or should
not comply with Title IX. We obviously believe that the NCAA should on a voluntary
basis comply with Title DC .... But we do not want to acknowledge that legal argument
that we are the recipient of federal funds.
Id.
19 0 For more examples, see generally Ronald J. Thompson, supra note 30. Thompson
.provides some evidence-consistent with Renee Smith's allegation-that the NCAA may be
systematically treating women more harshly than men. Thompson mentions the case of Tracy
Graham, an Iowa State University volleyball player who was declared ineligible because she
took the ACT test on a non-NCAA approved date. See id. at 1655-56. The NCAA Academic
Requirements Committee refused to hear her appeal. Meanwhile, a University of Pittsburgh
football player who accepted $2,500 from an agent was stripped of his eligibility but reinstated
by the NCAA on appeal. See id. at 1655 (citing Spiked, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1987,
at9, 12).
19 1 See Steve Rock, Waste Watchers Ruling Has Effect on NCAA Budget, KAN. CITY
STAR, Aug. 19, 1998, at Dl.
192 See, e.g., Big Loss, supra note 177 (noting that Ohio State University athletic director
Andy Geiger has spoken of a new "super division" of college sports outside the NCAA's
control). Big Ten conference commissioner Jim Delany has said, "We're poised to lead in a
new direction .... We have a number of regulatory issues to address, whether we're in the old




meets." 193 Of course, the likelihood or extent of such an occurrence is impossible
to predict, 194 but the threat is another obstacle the NCAA faces in preserving its
authority and credibility.
V. CONCLUSION
The Law verdict is not necessarily a death knell for the NCAA. It can almost
certainly defend the baseball bat regulation, and probably can withstand the
Adidas suit as well. But the NCAA must learn to check its arrogance at the
courthouse door (if not before) and choose its legal battles carefully. For example,
it should drop its limits on number of games-at least in football-before it is
sued in that regard and should take a hard look at its limits on the number of
coaches allowed in each sport. What is required is active participation of
competent counsel, who should be able to steer the NCAA through these troubled
waters despite the fact that this area of law is not entirely settled. Perhaps a fresh
start in a new city will help. The NCAA is in the process of moving its
headquarters from suburban Kansas City to downtown Indianapolis.195 The
organization's former headquarters have been called "charmless and uninviting,"
an unflattering but often accurate description of the organization itself. The new
building is said to have architectural charisma, and there are plans to include an
interactive sports museum on the grounds.196 With any luck, some of that
personality will rub off on the new structure's owners. If it does not, and the
NCAA does not prove willing to address the more obvious and blatant defects in
its rules, no one should be sorry to see the organization's demise.
193 Horgan, supra note 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 NCAA executive director Cedric Dempsey has said the threat is minimal because any
spinoff organization would have to install regulatory mechanisms nearly identical to the ones
the NCAA already has in place. See id.
195 See Bagnato, supra note 182, at 4.
196 See id NCAA officials have cited several long-term benefits of the move, including
being closer to most of the organization's membership, and an estimated cost savings of $50
million over the next 22 years from owning the building rather than leasing. See id.
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